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ABSTRACT 
This deliverable provides a general discussion of the international and Belgian legal framework 
applicable to operations of remotely piloted aircraft. Due to diverging use of many terms with 
different meaning in the field of unmanned aviation, the first part of the deliverable explains 
the different notions used and their meaning, establishing the use of common terminology in 
line with the international legal framework and the applicable Belgian legislation. It further 
discusses the applicable international legal framework and its impact on national and EU-level 
lawmaking in the field of unmanned aviation. 
The report considers the recent developments at EU level in the field of unmanned aviation. 
While it is mainly focused on the rules of the existing legal framework, it also touches upon 
some recent initiatives of EASA and the European Commission. It discusses the importance of 
common legal rules at EU level for the successful ‘take-off’ of unmanned aviation and how the 
existing barriers might impair the commercial success of these technologies. 
Following the analysis of the international safety legal framework, the report focuses on the 
specifics of the national legislation in Belgium. It situates the recently adopted Royal decree on 
the use of remotely piloted aircraft in Belgian airspace in the general aviation legal framework. 
It discusses the structure of the decree, focusing on the sections of importance to ensuring the 
safe operation of an unmanned aircraft. Finally, it will critically analyse the requirements of the 
royal decree in light of the recent policy and legislative initiatives at EU level. The report will 
particular focus on the level of autonomy allowed by the royal decree and will argue that a 
reasonable balance between safety and autonomy is critical to the success of commercial 
unmanned aviation. 
The final part of the report focuses on the elicitation and implementation of the non-functional 
legal requirements in the context of SafeDroneWare. It briefly discusses the strategies for 
extraction and quantification of legal requirements, the difficulties encountered in the context 
of SafeDroneWare and possible strategies for mitigating the lack of sufficient clarity in the legal 
provisions. The report provides a simple set of points that that could facilitate the elicitation of 
non-functional legal requirements in the development of software for remotely piloted aircraft 
in Belgium. 
  
3 | P a g e  
 
DOCUMENT HISTORY 
Version Date Modification reason Modified by 
1.0 21/03/2017 Final draft Ivo Emanuilov 
    
    
    
    
 
  
4 | P a g e  
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AGL Above Ground Level 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
ATS Air Traffic Service 
C2 Command and control 
CC44 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 
1944 
DGTA Federal Public Mobility and Transport Service Directorate 
General for Air Transport 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
EC European Commission 
EU European Union 
EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
HTA Helicopter training areas 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
JARUS Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems 
LFA Low flying areas 
PANS Procedures from Air Navigation Services 
QE Qualified Entity 
RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System 
SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices 
TRA Temporarily reserved airspace 
TSA Temporarily segregated airspace 
UAS Unmanned Aerial System 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
VLOS Visual Line of Sight 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
SafeDroneWare is a project that aims to develop an architecture and a reusable, integrated 
framework for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platform. The project takes an integrated 
approach to developing low-level and application-level software, reliable communication, 
drone sensors and hardware to ensure maximum safety and to support autonomous UAV 
behaviour. This will help businesses maximize cost-effectiveness while using UAVs in 
compliant and safe ways, helping European industries flourish. 
The present report corresponds to Task 6.1 ‘Inventory of relevant national and European law, 
and guidelines for developers on the basis of this inventory’. The research in this task sets out 
to identify the relevant national and European legal framework with a focus on certification, 
liability and the division of responsibilities. Recent developments in the field of unmanned 
aviation at EU level and in Belgium, in particular, will be studied in order to understand their 
implications in terms of safety of drone operations and autonomous flights. The report will 
summarise the applicable legal rules that have been used to elicit the non-functional legal 
requirements in Work Package 1 ‘Requirements Elicitation’. These rules will be critically 
discussed and the difficulties encountered will be explained along with possible strategies for 
developers to overcome them. Finally, a set of guidelines for developers engaged in the 
development of software frameworks for safe operations of remotely piloted aircraft will be 
drafted. 
The report is structured in the following way. 
Chapter I provides a general discussion of the international legal framework applicable to drone 
operations. Due to diverging use of many terms with different meaning in the field of unmanned 
aviation, the first part of this chapter will explain the different notions used and their meaning. 
It will suggest the use of common terminology in line with the international legal framework 
and the applicable Belgian legislation. The second part of the chapter will discuss the applicable 
international legal framework and its impact on national and EU-level lawmaking in the field 
of unmanned aviation. 
Chapter II discusses the recent developments at EU level in the field of unmanned aviation. 
While it is mainly focused on the rules of the existing legal framework, this chapter also touches 
upon some recent initiatives of EASA and the European Commission. It discusses the 
importance of common legal rules at EU level for the successful ‘take-off’ of unmanned 
aviation and how the existing barriers might impair the commercial success of these 
technologies. 
Chapter III focuses on the specifics of the national legislation in Belgium. This chapter will 
situate the recently adopted Royal decree on the use of remotely piloted aircraft in Belgian 
airspace in the general aviation legal framework. It will then discuss the structure of the decree, 
focusing on the sections of importance to ensuring the safe operation of an unmanned aircraft. 
The chapter will critically analyse the requirements of the royal decree in light of the recent 
policy and legislative initiatives at EU level. The chapter will particular focus on the level of 
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autonomy allowed by the royal decree and will argue that the balance between safety and 
autonomy is critical to the success of commercial unmanned aviation. 
Chapter IV focuses on the elicitation and implementation of the non-functional legal 
requirements in the context of SafeDroneWare. It will briefly discuss the strategies for 
extraction and quantification of legal requirements, the difficulties encountered in the context 
of SafeDroneWare and possible strategies for mitigating the lack of sufficient clarity in the legal 
provisions. This analysis will result in the development of a simple set of points that that could 
facilitate the elicitation of non-functional legal requirements in the development of software for 
remotely piloted aircraft in Belgium. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTERNATIONAL SAFETY LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF UNMANNED AVIATION  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the applicable international safety legal framework of 
unmanned aviation. It discusses the applicability of major international treaties that concern 
civil aviation matters of interest to both public and private international law. The purpose of 
this study is to define the broad framework within which unmanned aviation could be regulated. 
For the sake of clarity, this study will not go into detailed discussions about the private 
international law aspects of liability and insurance since the application of these rules depend 
on the specific context and very often, on national rules. 
Before discussing the international legal framework, it is important to find common ground for 
establishing a coherent taxonomy of the various notions and their meaning as used in the context 
of SafeDroneWare. There are multiple sources of concepts and notions, some of them 
overlapping, some of them contradicting with each other.2 As a preliminary first step, it is thus 
necessary to briefly examine the existing definitions, classify them and select a set of concepts 
that will be used throughout the report. Distinguishing between the terms has practical relevance 
since often different terms may lead to different qualifications and different legal 
consequences.3 
1. TERMINOLOGY 
 
Many terms are currently in use when it comes to drones. The word ‘drone’ itself is widely used 
by the media and the general public but it is rarely seen, if at all, in the vocabulary of any of the 
aviation authorities.4 Very often terms such as ‘unmanned aircraft’, ‘unmanned aerial vehicle’ 
(UAV), ‘unmanned aircraft system’ (UAS), ‘pilotless aircraft’, ‘pilotless aerial vehicle’, 
‘remotely operated aircraft’, ‘remotely piloted aircraft’ (RPA) and ‘remotely piloted aircraft 
systems’ (RPAS) are used interchangeably. However, as will be shown later on, some of these 
terms have different meaning and should be clearly distinguished. There are various criteria for 
distinguishing between the different categories of unmanned means of transportation, but the 
ones that have practical relevance are two. 
The first criteria distinguishes between unmanned vehicles based on the level of autonomy of 
the vehicle or, alternatively, on the level of involvement of the pilot. Thus, there are remotely 
operated vehicles and autonomous vehicles. Remotely operated vehicles are operated by natural 
persons from a distance and that implies that a human is consistently present, although remotely, 
during the operation of the vehicle. In contrast, autonomous vehicles are often regarded as 
                                                          
2 For a good overview of the different terms and acronyms used, see Kristian Bernauw, "Drones: The Emerging 
Era of Unmanned Civil Aviation," Zbornik PFZ 66 (2016): 226. 
3 Benjamyn Scott, "Key Provisions in Current Aviation Law," in The Future of Drone Use: Opportunities and 
Threats from Ethical and Legal Perspectives, ed. Bart Custers (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), 242. 
4 Ibid., 243. 
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‘robots’ which are self-governing, self-navigating and self-operating based on the combined 
actions of hardware sensors and adaptive software which processes the data collected by these 
sensors and adapts its behaviour based on the continuous changes in the environment.5 In fact, 
self-adaptability is the key difference between automatic and autonomous vehicles.6 While 
automation is linked with the ability of the vehicle to execute a set of instructions, autonomy is 
related to its ability to change its behaviour, to deal with uncertainty during runtime, taking into 
account the changes occurring in the environment. In its communication ‘A new era for 
aviation: Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft systems in a 
safe and sustainable manner’, the European Commission clarified that “RPAS form part of the 
wider category of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), which also includes aircraft that can be 
programmed to fly autonomously without the involvement of a pilot.”7 Furthermore, to avoid 
any doubt, the Commission further said that RPAS “are controlled by a pilot from a distance”. 
In the following chapters, it will be demonstrated that distinguishing between automatic and 
autonomous vehicles is particularly important in terms of allocation of liability. 
The second criteria distinguishes between an aircraft and an aircraft system. This distinction is 
practically important since it may have significant consequences, for example, when 
determining the scope of an insurance policy.8 Thus, it is not the same for an insurer whether 
the operator and/or the remote pilot is insured for risks related only to the operation of the 
aircraft or for the whole aircraft system. The aircraft system may include the equipment that is 
required for the operation of the aircraft, but it may equally include simply ancillary 
components, such as thermal or hyperspectral cameras, that are not essential to the operation of 
the drone.9 When and whether such an additional component will be considered part of the 
aircraft system, an essential component for the operation of the aircraft or an ancillary payload 
could be extremely important for defining limitations of liability.10 
These distinctions play a crucial role in defining the scope of regulatory intervention. Thus, for 
example, the Belgian Royal decree on the use of remotely piloted aircraft in Belgian airspace 
is applicable only to ‘remotely piloted aircraft’ which implies that autonomous unmanned 
aircraft are not subject to the rules of the decree. The legal framework on drones in Belgium 
                                                          
5 See more on self-adaptive software in Naeem Esfahani and Sam Malek, "Uncertainty in Self-Adaptive Software 
Systems," in Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems Ii (Springer, 2013), 214. 
6 Some authors, such as Scott, 244., seem to consider autonomy and automation as alternatives. However, such a 
position fails to account for the fact that a system can be automatic without being autonomous. See more in 
Bernauw,  227. 
7 European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 'a 
New Era for Aviation: Opening the Aviation Market to the Civil Use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in a 
Safe and Sustainable Manner'," (2014). 
8 Scott, 243. 
9 Bernauw,  226. argues that the word ‘system’ refers indeed to ancillary remote equipment component which is, 
however, required to operate the vehicle as opposed to the aircraft component. However, it remains unclear 
whether, for example, a camera will always be considered a non-essential payload and not a remote equipment 
component required for the operation of the aircraft. These issues need to be considered well in advance in order 
to ensure that all risks have been taken into account. 
10 Some authors consider that RPAS is an “overarching term for the entire system comprising an Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) which is applied to describe a self piloted or remotely piloted aircraft that can carry cameras, 
sensors, communications equipment or other payloads, as well those which support unmanned flights such as air 
traffic management and remote controllers of such aircraft”. See in this sense Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Convention 
on International Civil Aviation : A Commentary (New York: Springer, 2013), 121. 
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fits into the existing national and international framework of air law. It is thus necessary to 
construe the concepts employed by this framework in light of the international air law 
framework in order to understand the meaning of the concepts used by national legislations. 
At the international level, Article 8 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation 
of 1944 (CC44) refers to ‘pilotless aircraft’. The provision does not provide a straightforward 
definition of ‘pilotless aircraft’ but rather mandates that a special authorisation is required by 
the state whose territory is overflown by the aircraft flown without a pilot. This definition is 
somewhat clarified by a circular released by ICAO under the title ‘Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(RPAS)’.11 The document provides a glossary but subject to a disclaimer that the terms 
contained in it “have no official status within ICAO” and are used only in the context of the 
circular. The circular defines terms such as ‘autonomous aircraft’12, ‘autonomous operation’13, 
‘pilot-in-command’14, ‘remote pilot’15, ‘remote pilot station’16, ‘remotely-piloted’17, ‘remotely-
piloted aircraft’18, ‘unmanned aircraft’19 and ‘unmanned aircraft system’.20 Furthermore, in 
2012, ICAO amended Annexes 2 (Rules of the air), 7 (Nationality and registration marks) and 
13 (Accident investigation) to the Chicago Convention in order to clear the path for RPAS 
intended to be used by international civil aviation. Furthermore, in 2015, ICAO released a 
Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) (Doc 10019) which is set to provide 
guidance on RPAS matters in the legislative and regulatory processes.21 
In the case of EU, the legislative and regulatory processes are further detailed at either national 
or Union level. The criteria for this division will be examined in the following chapters. In the 
absence of any binding legal instruments adopted at EU level, the terms used in the proposals 
that are currently on the agenda seem to follow the distinctions made by ICAO in recognising 
remotely piloted aircraft as a subset of unmanned aircraft. The Commission is clear in saying 
                                                          
11 ICAO, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Rpas) Cir 328- an/190," ed. ICAO (2011). 
12 Defined as ‘an unmanned aircraft that does not allow pilot intervention in the management of the flight’, ibid. 
ix. 
13 Defined as ‘an operation during which a remotely-piloted aircraft is operating without pilot intervention in 
the management of the flight’, ibid. 
14 Defined as ‘the pilot designated by the operator, or in the case of general aviation, the owner, as being in 
command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight’, ibid x. 
15 Defined as ‘the person who manipulates the flight controls of a remotely-piloted aircraft during flight time’, 
ibid. 
16 Defined as ‘the station at which the remote pilot manages the flight of an unmanned aircraft’, ibid. 
17 Defined as ‘control of an aircraft from a pilot station which is not on board the aircraft’, ibid. 
18 Defined as ‘an aircraft where the flying pilot is not on board the aircraft’, ibid. It is to note ICAO has explicitly 
clarified here that RPA is a subcategory of unmanned aircraft. 
19 Defined as ‘an aircraft which is intended to operate with no pilot on board’, ibid. 
20 Defined as ‘an aircraft and its associated elements which are operated with no pilot on board’, ibid. 
21 Bernauw,  236. 
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that “drones which are automatically programmed – without being piloted, even remotely”22 
are not yet authorised for use neither by ICAO, nor by EU rules.23  
In an attempt to remedy the uncertainty brought by the existence of diverging regulations, 
EASA proposed a ‘Prototype’ Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations.24 
The proposal aims to fit into the new framework that is being discussed in the context of the 
reform of the existing Union provisions dealing with civil aviation safety as currently contained 
in Regulation (EC) No 216/2008.25 The ‘prototype’ regulation provides, among others, for 
definitions of ‘automatic flight’26, ‘remote pilot’27, ‘unmanned aircraft’28, and ‘unmanned 
aircraft system’.29 Finally, the systemic interpretation of Article 45 and Annex IX of the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Common Rules in 
the Field of Civil Aviation and Establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and 
Repealing Regulation (Ec) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council could 
be seen as an indication that the European rules will closely follow the definitions of ICAO. In 
fact, the adoption of this approach is already visible at national level. 
In Belgium, the Royal Decree on the use of remotely piloted aircraft in Belgian airspace closely 
follows the definitions of ICAO. Thus, the decree defines terms such as ‘model aircraft’30, 
‘remotely piloted aircraft’31, ‘remotely piloted aircraft system’32, ‘remote pilot’33, and ‘manned 
aircraft’.34 The approach of the Belgian legislator in defining ‘remotely piloted aircraft’ could 
                                                          
22 The Commission could be criticised for its choice of words in this memo. As previously noted, the mere fact 
that a drone is ‘automatically programmed’ does not mean ipso facto that it does not require a pilot but rather that 
some of its functions may have been pre-programmed to follow a particular routine. The distinction between 
autonomous and automatic drones is crucial. For example, the Belgian Royal decree on the use of remotely piloted 
aircraft in Belgian airspace explicitly prohibits the autonomous operations of unmanned aircraft which do not 
allow for the intervention of a pilot. It is the possibility for pilot intervention that determines whether the flight is 
autonomous or not, ie whether the aircraft is capable of handling a complete flight from take-off to landing without 
a single manual instruction from the pilot. Unlike autonomy, automation is not prima facie prohibited. Thus, for 
example, the aircraft’s software could provide for automatic obstacle avoidance or for automatic emergency 
landing. In any case, the possibility for a pilot intervention deprives the aircraft from its ‘autonomy’. 
23 European Commission, "Memo Remotely Piloted Aviation Systems (Rpas) - Frequently Asked Questions," 
(2014). 
24 European Aviation Safety Agency, "‘Prototype’ Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations," 
ed. EASA (2016). 
25 European Commission, "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Common 
Rules in the Field of Civil Aviation and Establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and Repealing 
Regulation (Ec) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Com/2015/0613 Final - 2015/0277 
(Cod))," ed. European Commission (2015). 
26 Defined by Article 2(2)(c) as ‘flight following preprogramed instructions, loaded in the unmanned aircraft (UA) 
flight control system, that the UA executes’. 
27 Defined by Article 2(2)(p) as ‘natural person who manipulates the flight controls of a UA, as appropriate, during 
a flight and is responsible for safely conducting the flight’. 
28 Defined by Article 2(2)(t) as ‘any aircraft operated or designed to be operated without a pilot on board’.  
29 Defined by Article 2(2)(v) as ‘UA and any equipment, apparatus, appurtenance, software or accessory that is 
necessary for the safe operation of the UA’. 
30 Defined by Article 1(9) as ‘remotely piloted aircraft used exclusively for sport and recreational purposes’. 
31 Defined by Article 1(4) as ‘an unmanned aircraft with a maximum take-off mass not exceeding 150 kg, piloted 
from a remote pilot station’. 
32 Defined by Article 1(5) as ‘remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote piloting system(s), the necessary 
command and control connections and all other elements, as specified in the type design’. 
33 Defined by Article 1(7) as ‘a person who performs the tasks essential to the operation of a remotely piloted 
aircraft and who, where applicable, operates the flight controls of a remotely piloted aircraft during its flight’. 
34 Defined by Article 1(11) as ‘any aircraft designed to be operated with a pilot on board’. 
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be criticised for its imprecision. Thus, for example, the definition refers to ‘unmanned aircraft’ 
without defining explicitly what is covered by that term. It is reasonable to assume that per 
argumentum a contrario from the definition of ‘manned aircraft’ in Article 1(11), unmanned 
aircraft should be understood in the same sense as defined in ICAO’s and EASA’s documents, 
ie, as a an aircraft which is designed (emphasis added) to operate with no pilot on board. 
This short overview of the existing terms demonstrates that the choice of words is not irrelevant 
when referring to drones, remotely piloted aircraft or unmanned aircraft. Different terms may 
lead to different interpretation and different legal consequences. It is therefore advisable that a 
common taxonomy of terms is established. Despite some critical remarks to the approach of the 
Belgian legislator, it is worth noting that the definitions of the royal decree fit into the 
framework delineated by the documents issued by ICAO and EASA so far. While these 
documents have no binding effect unless promulgated into legislation, in their role of ‘soft law’ 
sources, they may be used as guidance by the national legislators in adopting national rules. 
Considering this analysis and in line with SafeDroneWare’s national scope, the present report 
adopts the definitions used by the Belgian Royal decree on the use of remotely piloted aircraft 
in Belgian airspace complemented, where necessary and applicable, with inspiration from the 
documents and proposal issued by ICAO and EASA. 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY OF UNMANNED AVIATION 
 
The reference to both ‘international legal framework for safety’ and ‘unmanned aviation’ in 
this report is somewhat arbitrary. As it stands, there is no specific international legal framework 
for safety of remotely piloted aircraft, nor is there an official use of the term ‘unmanned 
aviation’. However, for the purpose of the present study, the terms will be used to refer to the 
possible set of international rules on safety that may be considered applicable in the context of 
remotely piloted aircraft. The purpose of this overview is to situate the Belgian national 
legislation into the broader legal framework and to identify sources which may be used for 
teleological interpretation of vague concepts used in national law. 
Remotely piloted aircraft give rise to a number of concerns which manned aviation has dealt 
with for a long period of time, such as airworthiness regulations, and the integration into non-
segregated airspace.35 Safety concerns have long been recognised as the major obstacle before 
the ‘mass use’ and integration of remotely piloted aircraft into non-segregated airspace.36 Thus, 
it is reasonable to ask: is it not possible to adapt the existing international rules for manned 
aviation to the operations of remotely piloted aircraft? 
The main legal instrument governing manned aviation at international level is CC44. In its 
Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), ICAO highlighted its primary goal of 
providing international regulatory framework through Standards and Recommended Practices 
(SARPs) with supporting Procedures from Air Navigation Services (PANS) and guidance 
                                                          
35 Abeyratne, 118. 
36 Bernauw,  228. 
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material, to support the routine operation of RPAS in a safe and harmonised manner comparable 
to that of manned aviation.37,38  
CC44 lays specific emphasis on the provisions dealing with the safety of operations. The 
convention applies to aircraft, defined by Annex 2, 6 & 8 of CC44 as “[a]ny machine that can 
derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the 
air against the earth’s surface”. The systemic interpretation of Annex 7 juncto Annex 2 of 
CC44 leads to the conclusion that remotely piloted aircraft fall within the definition of ‘power-
driven aircraft’ regardless of whether it concerns a fixed-wing aeroplane, lighter-than-air 
airship, or a rotary-wing helicopter. The fact that remotely piloted aircraft are covered by the 
definition untied ICAO’s hands to exercise its regulatory competencies and introduce rules that 
also cover remotely piloted aircraft.39 
Autonomy 
There is an ongoing discussion in literature on the interpretation of Article 8 CC44 and its 
reference to ‘pilotless’ aircraft. The prevailing interpretation is that the provision of Article 8 
refers to cases where the pilot is not physically located on board the aircraft. This interpretation, 
however, fails to account for the grammatical interpretation of the provision which implies that 
the aircraft operates without a pilot in all cases. Some authors have suggested that interpreting 
Article 8 in light of the general rule of interpretation of treaties enshrined in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties will lead to the conclusion that only autonomous 
aircraft are included, ie aircraft that have no pilot at all.40 The rule of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention states that the interpretation should be in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
Such interpretation, however, seems to leave out of CC44’s scope remotely piloted aircraft and 
thus needs to be corrected by means of teleological interpretation which also considers the 
object and the purpose of the convention.  
The following additional criticisms could be made on the interpretation of the provision. The 
provision’s text reads that the aircraft is “capable of being flown”, implying that someone else 
is still flying it, even though there is no pilot on board. If that was not the case, the drafters 
would have chosen the active verb ‘fly’ to describe that the aircraft is indeed autonomous. Some 
might argue the French text makes use of the present participle of the verb ‘pouvoir’ (pouvant) 
to describe that an aircraft ‘that may fly’. However, the Russian text refers to „воздушное 
судно, способное совершать полеты без пилота“ which could mean that both the aircraft is 
capable of flying and that it capable of being flown. Furthermore, in the foreword to CC44, the 
convention’s drafters have explicitly stated that the convention’s language versions are equally 
authentic, which means that no precedence could be given to the English text over the French 
                                                          
37 International Civil Aviation Organization, "Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (Doc 10019)," ed. 
International Civil Aviation Organization (2015), V. 
38 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, "Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: Some Unexplored Issues," Air and Space Law 41, 
no. 3 (2016): 291. 
39 Pablo Mendes de Leon and Benjamyn Ian Scott, "An Analysis of Unmanned Aircraft Systems under Air Law," 
in Drones and Unmanned Aerial Systems: Legal and Social Implications for Security and Surveillance, ed. Aleš 
Završnik (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 189. 
40 Ibid., 192. 
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or the Russian one. However, as Article 31 of the Vienna Convention prescribes, the 
interpretation should also take into account the object and the purpose of the treaty. 
Furthermore, the systemic interpretation of the first and the second sentence of the provision’s 
text reveals that a degree of control is required and that the control exercised is not 
autonomous.41 Thus, we disagree with the authors who argue that “[i]t is unclear from only the 
text of the Article which interpretation prevails”.42 The comparative grammatical, teleological 
and systemic interpretation of Article 8 all point towards aircraft that can fly only when being 
controlled from outside, ie Article 8 CC44 does not provide for autonomous flights. 
 
Territorial scope 
Article 8 of CC44 subjects the operation of these aircraft to national authorisation.43 As CC44 
regulates international aviation, domestic operations will not be covered by it unless they meet 
the international criterion. 
While in the military context this criterion is easily met, this will not be the case very often for 
civil applications of remotely piloted aircraft. While the international element is often 
considered by national legislation, in many cases it is the national law that will determine the 
applicable rules in terms of both territorial scope and safety. 
 
Safety 
There are currently no international standards and recommended practices (SARPs) adopted at 
international level.44  
Article 31 CC44 provides that every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be 
provided with a certificate of airworthiness issued or rendered valid by the state in which it is 
registered. In addition, Annex 8 CC44 (in its ninth edition) lays down the SARPs for the 
issuance of airworthiness certificates but they only concern aeroplanes over 5700 kg certified 
take-off mass and helicopters “without a limitation on the mass of an aircraft which is intended 
for the carriage of passengers or cargo or mail in international air navigation”.45 It follows that 
the SARPs established with Annex 8 CC44 will not be applicable to remotely piloted aircraft. 
The tenth edition of the amended the requirements to also cover helicopters with certified take-
off mass over 750 kg. 
                                                          
41 In the English, French and Russian language versions, as follows: “the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in 
regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled”, “le vol d’un tel aéronef sans pilote dans des régions ouvertes 
aux aéronefs civils soit soumis à un contrôle” and “полете такого воздушного судна без пилота в районах, 
открытых для гражданских воздушных судов, обеспечить такой контроль” (emphasis added). 
42 Mendes de Leon and Scott, 193. 
43 Bernauw,  229. 
44 Abeyratne, Convention on International Civil Aviation : A Commentary, 118. 
45 Ibid., 124. 
14 | P a g e  
 
Article 29 CC4 stipulates that every aircraft of a contracting state, engaged in international 
navigation, shall carry the following documents in conformity with the conditions prescribed 
in the convention: 
 Certificate of registration; 
 Certificate of airworthiness; 
 Appropriate licences for each member of the crew; 
 Journey log book; 
 Aircraft radio station licence, if equipped with radio apparatus; 
 List of names of passengers and places of embarkation and destination, if the aircraft 
carries passengers; 
 Manifest and detailed declarations of the cargo, if the aircraft carries cargo. 
These requirements are applicable to remotely piloted aircraft. Some authors have recognised, 
however, the difficulty in meeting some of the requirements, eg, the carriage of documents in 
the aircraft itself. Thus, these authors suggest that a possible solution might be to store the data 
and licences electronically on the board the vehicle. This poses questions of the legal validity 
of such form in the absence of explicit rules to this effect.46 
Annex 2 CC44 established the rules of the air and prescribes that for air travel to be safe and 
efficient, a set of internationally agreed rules of the air is required. These rules consist of general 
rules, visual flight rules and instrument flight rules. Annex 2 provides the details to the rules 
established in Article 12 CC44. Article 12 prescribes that each contracting state undertakes to 
adopt measures to insure that every aircraft flying over or manoeuvring within its territory and 
that every aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply 
with the rules and regulations relating to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft there in force. 
These rules apply also to remotely piloted aircraft.47 It is noteworthy that Article 3.3 to 
Appendix 4 of Annex 2 CC44 mandates that ‘unmanned balloons’ must be equipped with at 
least two payload flight termination devices or systems. Some authors believe this requirement 
is also applicable to remotely piloted aircraft which would oblige the pilot-in-command to take 
action to best avert collision.48 These authors conclude that “pilots flying according to 
instrument flight rules are required to scan the environment visually in order to detect 
potentially conflicting traffic”. This is in fact one of the problems that SafeDroneWare seeks to 
resolve. 
In light of the safety’s crucial role, in 2011 ICAO released a circular entitled ‘Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (RPAS)’ which aimed to apprise states of the emerging ICAO perspective on 
the integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace and at aerodromes; consider the 
fundamental differences from manned aviation that such integration will involve; and 
encourage states to help with the development of ICAO policy on UAS by providing 
information on their own experiences associated with these aircraft.49 ICAO relies on the 
                                                          
46 Ibid., 125. A similar suggestion has also been made by ICAO in ICAO,  13.  
47 Abeyratne, Convention on International Civil Aviation : A Commentary, 125. 
48 Ibid., 126. 
49 ICAO,  2. 
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premise that unmanned aircraft are ‘aircraft’ per the convention’s definition and as such all 
SARPs applicable to aircraft are also applicable to remotely piloted aircraft.50 The circular is 
organised to reflect the three traditional areas of aviation: operations, equipment and personnel. 
The circular solves the legal limbo created by the diverging interpretations of Article 8 CC44 
by referring to Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept (Doc 9854), which states 
that “[a]n unmanned aerial vehicle is a pilotless aircraft, in the sense of Article 8 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, which is flown without a pilot-in-command on-
board and is either remotely and fully controlled from another place (ground, another aircraft, 
space) or programmed and fully autonomous.” In particular, the circular specifies that the intent 
of the convention’s drafters in providing for “aircraft flown without a pilot” refers to a situation 
where there is no pilot on board the aircraft.51 Furthermore, it provides that only remotely 
piloted aircraft will be able to integrate into the international civil aviation system in the 
“foreseeable future”.52  
The circular highlights the important role of the remote pilot in ensuring the safe and predictable 
operation of the aircraft interacting with other civil aircraft and the air traffic management 
system. The circular further clarifies that model aircraft are excluded from the scope of 
application of the convention. ICAO also confirms its commitment to keeping all terms in 
common use unchanged by the introduction of UAS. In particular, it highlights that the function 
of the pilot remains intact regardless of the fact that person or persons responsible are not on 
board the aircraft. The circular elucidates that the pilot-in-command shall be responsible as a 
pilot of a manned aircraft for detection and avoidance of potential collisions and other hazards.53 
Furthermore, it clarifies that in the foreseeable future no carriage of passengers on board will 
be allowed on board UAS. ICAO considers the ability of remotely piloted aircraft to respond 
and act in the way manned aircraft do a key factor in the safe integration of UAS in non-
segregated airspace. 
In light of Article 8 CC44, the circular emphasises that the pilot of the remotely piloted aircraft 
will have to comply with instructions provided by the state, including using electronic and 
visual means, and have the ability to divert to a specified airport at the state’s request.54 It further 
confirms that the rules of the air apply to all aircraft, regardless of whether they are manned or 
unmanned and that in accordance with Article 12 and Annex 2, the pilot-in-command is 
responsible for the operation of the aircraft in compliance with these rules. The circular also 
stresses on the importance of developing SARPs for remotely piloted aircraft. It encourages 
states to develop national regulations facilitating mutual recognition of certificates of unmanned 
aircraft.55  
The circular highlighted the challenges of integrating remotely piloted aircraft into the existing 
system of certification. Some of the concerns relate to the fact that remotely piloted aircraft 
                                                          
50 Abeyratne, Convention on International Civil Aviation : A Commentary, 127. 
51 ICAO,  11. 
52 Ibid., 3. 
53 Abeyratne, Convention on International Civil Aviation : A Commentary, 129. 
54 ICAO,  11. 
55 Ibid., 14. 
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cannot operate without supporting system elements, such as remote pilot station, command and 
control link etc., as well as due to the possibility for changing elements of the system. Other 
concerns refer to the issue of the possibility for locating the different components of the system 
in different states. In terms of airworthiness, the circular confirms that Article 31 and 33 CC44 
are applicable to remotely piloted aircraft but may require further elaboration and interpretation 
in the context of the following issues: 
 SARPs are limited to aircraft over 750 kg intended for carriage of passengers or cargo 
or mail; 
 SARPs for remote pilot stations; 
 Provisions for command and control (C2) data links. 
The circular’s purpose is to act as guidance for regulators and legislators in the adoption of 
national rules. However, until an international framework of rules and regulations is adopted, 
non-binding documents like this circular will only have a limited impact. 
 
3. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY 
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT 
 
In air law, the liability for damages is the subject of several international treaties dealing with 
second- and third-party liability. These will only briefly be analysed here since their 
applicability in the context of remotely piloted aircraft may depend on restrictions imposed in 
national law.56 
Second-party liability 
Second party liability deals with the liability of the carrier or operator for damage to passengers 
or cargo. This type of liability applies in cases based on an existing contractual link between 
the parties. At international level, the most recent legal instrument is the 1999 Convention for 
the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, known as the Montreal 
Convention, establishes some of the rules. Since it regulates “certain rules” only, it is not meant 
to unify extensively the second-liability regime.57  
Article 1 of the Montreal Convention defines the scope of application relying on the criterion 
of ‘internationality’ of the activity. Thus, it applies to all international carriage of persons, 
baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward as well as to gratuitous carriage by aircraft 
performed by an air transport undertaking. The second paragraph of Article 1 clarifies that 
“international carriage” means “any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the 
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in 
the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two States Parties, or 
within the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory 
                                                          
56 This is the case with the Belgian law which explicitly prohibits certain operations with remotely piloted aircraft, 
including carriage of passengers and cargo. 
57 Mendes de Leon and Scott, 204. 
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of another State, even if that State is not a State Party”. Finally, the text of Article 1 explicitly 
provides that carriage between two points within the territory of a single state party without an 
agreed stopping place within the territory of another state is not international carriage. 
Based on the scope of application, the criteria for applicability of the Montreal Convention 
seem to be the following three: 
 The vehicle must be an aircraft 
It seems reasonable to assume that the term ‘aircraft’ will be construed in the meaning it has in 
CC44. Furthermore, the Montreal Convention, in its preamble, reaffirms the parties’ desirability 
“of an orderly development of international air transport operations and the smooth flow of 
passengers, baggage and cargo in accordance with the principles and objectives of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation”. Thus, the elements of the definition, as elaborated 
above, will also be relevant in the context of the Montreal Convention. 
 The activity must be international carriage (emphasis added) 
The international element is crucial for the application of the Montreal Convention. Since many 
of the existing civil operations with remotely piloted aircraft are national, the likelihood of an 
operation falling within the ambit of this legal instrument seems to be low. 
 The carriage must be of persons, baggage or cargo 
Interpreted in line with ICAO’s circular suggestions for the rate of adoption of remotely piloted 
aircraft in the near future, it seems unlikely that the convention will be applicable to activities 
involving carriage of persons any time in the foreseeable future. Some authors argue that the 
convention will still be applicable to cases involving carriage of cargo and that this is a market 
likely to grow.58 While this seems to be indeed correct, some national legislators have taken 
quite a restrictive approach by prohibiting even operations involving carriage of cargo.59 
In the cases where the Montreal Convention is applicable, the rules of Chapter III set out the 
liability of the carrier and extent of compensation for damage. However, many of these rules 
will need to be interpreted in light of the specifics of remotely piloted aircraft. Thus, the 
requirement of Article 17 that the liability of the carrier for “death or bodily injury of a 
passenger” is triggered upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury 
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or 
disembarking, is clearly not applicable in the context of remotely piloted aircraft. In 
comparison, the rules of Article 18 on liability for damages to cargo could be applicable since 
the condition that triggers their applicability refers to an event that takes place during the 
carriage by air. 
It is apparent that a number of loopholes in the second-party liability regime cannot be closed 
only by means of interpretation. The Montreal Convention will likely have to revised and 
complemented as remotely piloted aircraft gain larger market shares in the years to come. 
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59 Cf. Article 6 (3) of the Belgian Royal decree on the use of remotely piloted aircraft in Belgian airspace. 
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Third-party liability 
At international level, third-party liability is the subject of the 1952 Convention on Damage 
Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, commonly known as the Rome 
Convention. This convention lays down the international rules for compensation for persons 
who suffer damage caused on the surface by foreign aircraft. 
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Rome Convention stipulates that “any person who suffers damage 
on the surface shall, upon proof only that the damage was caused by an aircraft in flight or by 
any person or thing falling therefrom, be entitled to compensation as provided by this 
Convention. Nevertheless, there shall be no right to compensation if the damage is not a direct 
consequence of the incident giving rise thereto, or if the damage results from the mere fact of 
passage of the aircraft through the airspace in conformity with existing air traffic regulations”. 
The criteria for ‘activating’ the convention’s rules on liability could be summarised, as follows: 
 A person must suffer damage; 
 The damage should occur on the surface; 
 The damage must be caused by an aircraft in flight or by any person or thing falling 
therefrom; 
 The damage must be caused by an aircraft in another signatory state of the convention; 
 The damage must be a direct consequence of the incident which has given rise to it. 
The convention apparently mandates the cumulative action of all the elements in order to apply 
to a particular situation. The convention’s impact is severely diminished due to the fact that it 
does not have a universal application and major countries, such as the USA and China, are not 
signatories to it.  
The convention could also be criticised for its unclear rules on the identification of the aircraft’s 
operator.60 Thus, Article 2(1) attached the liability for compensation to the operator, who is 
defined in paragraph 2 as “the person who was making use of the aircraft at the time the damage 
was caused, provided that if control of the navigation of the aircraft was retained by the person 
from whom the right to make use of the aircraft was derived, whether directly or indirectly, that 
person shall be considered the operator”. Arguably, in cases of commercial exploitation the 
operator will be the legal person and not its employees. The case is more difficult in the scenario 
of recreational use where the person who has control of the aircraft’s navigation could change 
multiple times. As some national laws have mandated the registration of remotely piloted 
aircraft, it will arguably become easier to identify the operator; however, the issue is still likely 
to be present in the context of damage caused by an aircraft in another signatory state of the 
Rome Convention. 
Given the limited scope of the convention and the difficulties in its application, it is to be 
expected that recourse to the national rules on tortious and product liability will often have to 
be made in these cases. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The overview of the international safety legal framework shows that there are multiple rules 
which could be successfully construed and applied in the context of both manned and unmanned 
aviation. However, ICAO has properly recognised the need of specific SARPs to take into 
account the specifics of remotely piloted aircraft. Furthermore, even though the public 
international framework can be complemented with new rules on safety by means of SARPs 
and other ‘soft’ measures, the same cannot be said about the rules that deal with issues of private 
international law, such as liability for damages. Against this background, the EU seems to be 
sitting in a favourable position because of EASA and European Commission’s recent efforts to 
extend the concept of a ‘Single European Sky’61 to cover remotely piloted aircraft.  
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CHAPTER II 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT EU LEVEL IN THE FIELD OF SAFETY OF UNMANNED 
AVIATION  
 
This chapter discusses the recent developments in the EU that concern the safety rules for 
remotely piloted aircraft. While it is mainly focused on the rules of the existing legal 
framework, this chapter also touches upon some recent initiatives of EASA and the European 
Commission. It discusses the importance of common legal rules at EU level for the successful 
‘take-off’ of unmanned aviation and how the existing barriers might hinder the commercial 
success of these technologies. 
1. OVERVIEW OF RECENT POLICY INITIATIVES IN THE EU 
 
The European Commission foresees that within 20 years, the European drone sector will 
“directly employ more than 100 000 people” and will have an “economic impact exceeding €10 
billion per year, mainly in services”.62 The Commission also recognised the need of European 
safety rules for civil drones. Thus, its efforts have resulted in the adoption of a proposal for the 
revision of EASA Basic Regulation 216/2008 on 8 December 201563 to cover the elements 
necessary to enable the development of safety rules for remotely piloted aircraft. EASA also 
took initiative by publishing a draft of Commission implementing rules as a ‘Prototype’ 
Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations64 and its Explanatory Note65. These 
rules are based on a Technical opinion on the operation of drones66, published in 2015, as well 
as on a Concept of Operations for Drones67 and a Proposal to create common rules for operating 
drones in Europe68. 
The initiatives at EU level date back to 2013 when the European RPAS Steering Group 
published a final report entitled ‘Roadmap for the integration of civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft 
Systems into the European Aviation System’.69 The roadmap highlighted the importance of 
                                                          
62 European Commission, Unmanned aircrafts, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/aeronautics/rpas_en, last accessed: 10th March 2017.  
63 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52015PC0613, last accessed: 21 
March 2017.  
64 Available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/UAS%20Prototype%20Regulation%20final.pdf, last 
accessed: 21 March 2017.  
65 Available at: 
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Explanatory%20Note%20for%20the%20UAS%20Prototype%20re
gulation%20final.pdf, last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
66 Available at: 
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Introduction%20of%20a%20regulatory%20framework%20for%20t
he%20operation%20of%20unmanned%20aircraft.pdf, last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
67 Available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/204696_EASA_concept_drone_brochure_web.pdf, 
last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
68 Available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/205933-01-
EASA_Summary%20of%20the%20ANPA.pdf, last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
69 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/10484/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native, 
last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
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harmonised rules at European level for the promotion of safety for citizens and improving the 
development of the internal EU market. 
In 2014, the European Commission published a Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, entitled ‘A new era for aviation. Opening the aviation 
market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft systems in a safe and sustainable manner’.70 
The Commission recognised that remotely piloted aircraft form part of a wider category of 
unmanned aerial systems which also include systems capable of autonomous flights. Thus, the 
Commission explicitly clarified that its efforts are directed towards aircraft that are “controlled 
by a pilot from a distance”.71 The Commission argued that remotely piloted aircraft should be 
able to fly as part of the system involving ‘normally piloted’ aircraft, ie, in non-segregated 
airspace. The European strategy on remotely piloted aircraft aims to create a single market for 
remotely piloted aircraft but admits that this would only be possible if these aircraft are 
integrated into the wider civil aviation system. The strategy reveals several objectives: 
 Safety. The integration of remotely piloted aircraft into the aviation system should not 
compromise safety. The regulatory framework should consider the variety of aircraft 
and operations to keep the rules “proportionate to the potential risk and contain 
administrative burden for industry and for the supervisory authorities”.72 EASA is 
recognised as “best placed” to develop common rules. The Communication argued that 
EASA’s restricted competence to unmanned aircraft above 150 kg based on classical 
airworthiness considerations should be reconsidered as it seems ‘arbitrary’. The rules 
should be compatible with ICAO standards and should be proportionate to risk. They 
should consider, among others, the weight, speed, complexity, airspace class and place 
of specificity of operations. The communications further argues that the traditional 
process of airworthiness certification should be complemented by ‘light touch’ forms 
of regulation. 
 Safe operation into non-aggregated airspace: enabling technologies. The 
Commission highlighted that certain technologies need development and validation, 
incl. command and control (incl. spectrum allocation and management), detect and 
avoid technologies, security protection against physical, electronic or cyber-attacks, 
transparent and harmonised contingency procedures, decision capabilities to ensure 
standardised and predictable behaviour in all phases of flight; and human factor issues, 
eg, piloting. 
 Ensure security of operations. The potential use of remotely piloted aircraft as 
weapons, the risk of ‘jamming’ the navigation or communication signals of other 
aircraft or the hijacking of remote pilot stations are all seen as major security risks. The 
Commission laid emphasis on the importance of properly addressing the security 
aspects in order to avoid unlawful interference and to encourage manufacturers and 
operators to consider security mitigating measures. 
                                                          
70 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014DC0207, last accessed: 21 
March 2017. 
71 Ibid. 2. 
72 Ibid. 5. 
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 Fundamental rights protection. Citizens’ fundamental rights should not be infringed 
by the operation of remotely piloted aircraft. In particular, the Commission points to the 
right to private and family life and the right to personal data protection. It is also noted 
that in terms of privacy and data protection, most commonly the risks concern the 
installation of surveillance equipment on board the aircraft. The Commission identified 
the need of expert consultations, awareness rising and promotion measures under 
national competence. 
 Guaranteeing third party liability and insurance. The parties liable for damage should 
be easily identifiable and should be able to meet their financial obligations. The 
Commission noted that the existing third-party insurance regime is designed for 
operations of manned aircraft where the take-off mass starts from 500 kg and is used as 
a main criterion to determine the minimum amount of insurance. The Commission 
undertook to assess the existing liability regime and third-party insurance requirements 
in order to ensure that the risks relating to operations of remotely piloted aircraft are 
properly addressed. 
 Supporting market development and European industries. The Commission also 
undertook to promote the development of remotely piloted aircraft applications in a 
wide range of sectors, to stimulate innovation and foster the creation of cross-sectoral 
value chains. The aim is to define specific actions to support the development of this 
nascent market. 
Following the Commission’s Communication of 2014, in March 2015, in Riga, Violeta Bulc, 
EU Commissioner for Mobility and Transport, summarised the main principles to guide the 
regulatory allowing civil operations of remotely piloted aircraft throughout Europe. The Riga 
Declaration73 formulated the following main principles: 
 Drones need to be treated as new types of aircraft with proportionate rules based on 
the risk of each operation. Rules should be simple and performance based. 
 EU rules for the safe provisions of drone services need to be developed now. They 
should be harmonised at the global level as much as possible. 
 Technologies and standards need to be developed for the full integration of drones in 
European airspace. There is a need for adequate investment in the technologies 
required to integrate them into the aviation system – SESAR programme. 
 Public acceptance is key to the growth of drones services. Citizens’ fundamental rights 
need to be guaranteed. Guidelines and monitoring mechanism should be developed to 
ensure the full respect of existing protection rules. 
 The operator of the drone is responsible for its use. It will also be necessary to ensure 
that drones have an identifiable owner or operator. Also, the insurance and third-party 
liability regime should be clarified by Member States and reporting of drone accidents 
should be “integrated into the overall incident reporting requirements”.74 
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03-06-riga-declaration-drones.pdf, last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
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In May 2015, EASA published a ‘Concept of Operations for Drones. A risk based approach to 
regulation of unmanned aircraft’. This document argued for the creation of a “proportionate, 
progressive, risk based” system of rules for drones. It was argued that these rules must express 
objectives that are to be complemented by industry standards and that the regulatory framework 
should set a level of safety and environmental protection acceptable to society but also offering 
flexibility and adaptiveness.75 This concept suggested three categories of drone operations and 
their associated regulatory regime: open, specific and certified. The concept of operations 
identified several important safety risks that need to be considered76, namely:  
 Mid-air collision; 
 Harm to people; 
 Damage to property, in particular critical and sensitive infrastructure. 
Following the concept of operations, in September 2015, EASA published a ‘Proposal to create 
common rules for operating drones in Europe’. The proposal suggested the creation of common 
European safety rules for operating drones regardless of their weight. It highlighted that the 
existing regime requires that drones with a take-off mass above 150 kg are regulated in a way 
similar to other aircraft in manned aviation. Drones with a take-off mass below 150 kg are 
therefore regulated by each Member State in accordance with its national legislation. This, 
however, creates a risk for fragmentation of the market and short-sighted vision since weight is 
not the only relevant criterion. EASA suggested the adoption of common safety rules in Europe 
regardless of the drones’ weight. The approach was termed ‘proportional and operation-
centric’. This new line thus suggests turning the focus from the characteristic of the drone itself 
to the conditions and the manner in which the drone is used. With this document, EASA made 
33 specific proposals. Among others, these proposals suggested regulation of commercial and 
non-commercial operations as the same drone may be used for both commercial and non-
commercial activities. They also highlighted the importance of establishing the three categories 
of operation of drones as proposed in the concept of operations. In particular, the proposal 
suggested the following: 
o Open category, which presents low risk and where safety is ensured through 
operations limitations, compliance and industry standards, and the requirement 
to have certain functionalities and a minimum set of operational rules. In this 
category, enforcement is expected to be carried out mainly by the police. 
o Specific category (medium risk), where an authorisation by a national aviation 
authority is required and which is assisted by an organisation which may be 
allocated a specific certification task (Qualified Entity, QE), following a risk 
assessment carried out by the operator. 
o Certified category (high risk), where the requirements are comparable to those 
for manned aviation. In this case, oversight by the national aviation authority 
and by EASA will likely be involved. 
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last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
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The proposals also suggested designation of responsible authorities for the enforcement of the 
regulations in EASA Member States and exclusion of the ‘open’ and ‘specific’ categories from 
the EU aviation system. Furthermore, it was proposed that the Member States be given local-
level flexibility without being subject to oversight on the part of EASA and that procedures be 
established for approval and audit of QEs by the national aviation authorities or EASA to make 
sure they adhere to common rules. Finally, the proposal then specified details concerning the 
three categories. Since this document has further been superseded by other documents, it will 
not be further analysed here. However, it is important to note that it suggested the creation of a 
three-category classification of drones based on the operations and not on their weight. 
In December 2015, EASA published a ‘Technical Opinion. Introduction of a regulatory 
framework for the operation of unmanned aircraft’. This opinion was the result of the ‘Proposal 
to create common rules for operating drones in Europe’ and was developed in parallel to the 
amendments to the Basic Regulation. It included 27 proposals for a regulatory framework and 
for low-risk operations of unmanned aircraft regardless of their take-off mass. The opinion once 
again highlighted the new framework is based on the principles of operation-centric, 
proportional, risk- and performance-based rules. As a technical opinion, the draft did not 
include any legal texts and will thus not be analysed in detail here. 
In November 2016, the Polish Minister of Infrastructure and Construction Andrzej Adamczyk 
hosted the Warsaw High Level Conference also attended by European Commissioner Violeta 
Bulc, the Executive Director of EASA Mr Patrick Ky, the acting President of the Polish CAA 
Mr Piotr Samson, the Executive of the SESAR Joint Undertaking Director Florian Guillermet, 
a number of Directors General of Civil Aviation from the EU Member States, representatives 
of ICAO, international associations, European bodies, Agencies, together with leaders of the 
industry.77 The conference called for several coordinated actions to develop an EU drone 
ecosystem to be delivered before 2019. The Warsaw Declaration, entitled ‘Drones as a leverage 
for jobs and new business opportunities’, summarised these actions, as followed: 
 EASA should further the interaction between drones and manned aircraft. 
 A simple-to-use, affordable, commercially and operationally friendly drone ecosystem 
should be developed, capable of addressing all societal concerns such as safety, security, 
privacy and environmental protection. 
 Safety rules should be developed that are simple, proportionate to the risk of the 
operation, performance-based, future-proof, and based on global standards. Industry 
should aim to develop open standards to support performance-based regulation. 
 There is a need for urgent action on the airspace dimension, ie the development of the 
concept of ‘U-Space’ on access to low level airspace, especially in urban areas. 
 The whole EU drone community should participate in demonstrators to test as rapidly 
and as effectively as possible the feasibility of the requirements and standards of the U-
Space. 
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 There is a need to tackle security issues and to enhance the cooperation between 
security, defence and safety actors. 
 There is a need to promote education and safety to increase actors’ awareness, especially 
those without an aviation background. 
 An effective coordination mechanism between the Commission, the relevant European 
agencies, and stakeholders to reflect on the drone services market and to monitor, advise 
and assist with the establishment of a regulatory framework, efficacy and funding of 
drone integration projects, and development of U-Space.  
In January 2017, EASA announced its Rulemaking and Safety Promotion Programme 2017-
2021.78 The programme. One of the programme’s strategic priorities is to ensure the safe 
operation of drones.79 The programme recognised that the lack of harmonised rules at EU level 
makes unmanned aircraft systems operations dependent on an individual authorisation by each 
Member State. It suggested that obviating the administrative burden and restrictions will 
encourage companies to make best use of these technologies. Furthermore, the programme 
highlighted that “consistent requirements and expectations will help manufacturers design for 
all conditions and ease compliance with requirements by operators”.80 The programme also 
recognised the impact of security and safety and emphasised that the multiplication on network 
connections increase the whole system’s vulnerability. The ultimate goal is to create a level 
playing field in all EU Member States. Relying on an operation centric concept, proportionate 
and risk- and performance-based, it aims to encourage investment and innovation while 
maintaining a high level of safety across Member States.81 Specific actions outlined by the 
Rulemaking and Safety Promotion Programme 2017-2021 include development of rules for 
three categories of unmanned aerial systems based on EC communication COM(2015)613 and 
the proposals to amend the Basic Regulation.82 
2. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AT EU LEVEL 
 
In terms of legislation at EU level, the existing framework comprises: 
 Regulation 216/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a 
European Aviation Safety Agency (Basic Regulation) 
 Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down the framework for the creation of the single European sky 
 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community 
 Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators 
                                                          
78 Available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/RMP-EPAS_2017-2021.pdf, last accessed: 21 March 
2017. 
79 Ibid. 10. 
80 Ibid. 11. 
81 Ibid. 55. 
82 Ibid. 56. 
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The Basic Regulation governs remotely piloted aircraft with take-off mass above 150 kg subject 
to authorisation by EASA. In particular, Annex II to the regulation, in connection with Article 
4(4), clarifies that Article 4(1), (2) and (3) do not apply to aircraft falling in one or more of the 
categories set out below: (i) unmanned aircraft with an operating mass of no more than 150 kg. 
Thus, it follows that unmanned aircraft with an operating mass of less than 150 kg are not 
subject to regulation at EU level under the existing regime. 
Proposal for a new Basic Regulation 
In 2016, the European Commission published the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a 
European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. The proposal abandons the requirement for 150 kg 
operating mass and shifts the focus to the inherent risk of a particular operation. It also 
highlights that unmanned aircraft will become another type of aerial vehicle to provide a range 
of new services in the European aviation market within the context of Regulation (EC) 
1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community. Furthermore, 
it explicitly places unmanned aircraft under the overall aviation policy as they will share the 
same space with other aircraft which also requires that their operations are consistent with air 
traffic rules as laid down in the Common Rules of the Air. 
In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the proposal clarifies that Member State authorities 
will carry out local risk assessments and decide which airspace shall be open or closed to 
unmanned aircraft operations, and under which conditions. At the same time, it stipulates that 
most of the light unmanned aircraft operations have a local dimension and it should be for the 
local authorities to assess the level of risk and authorise the specific type of operation. 
The proposal introduces new definitions that are key to understanding the scope of regulation. 
The provision of Article 3 (29) defines unmanned aircraft as ‘any aircraft operated or designed 
to be operated without a pilot on board’. Article 3 (30) defines ‘equipment to control unmanned 
aircraft remotely’ as “any equipment, apparatus, appurtenance, software or accessory that is 
necessary for the safe operation of an unmanned aircraft”. Article 3 (32) defines ‘state aircraft’ 
as “aircraft when carrying out military, customs, police, search and rescue, firefighting, 
coastguard or similar activities or services under the control and responsibility of a Member 
State, undertaken in the public interest by a body vested with public authority powers”. 
Article 2 of the proposal introduced the possibility for Member States to apply certain 
provisions of the new Regulation to activities and services performed by state aircraft. The opt-
in regime concerns customs, police, search and rescue, firefighting, coastguard or similar 
activities or services, as well as ATM/ANS provided by the military. 
Article 45-47 of the Proposal contain the legal basis for more detailed rules on unmanned 
aircraft. Particularly, Article 45 refers to Annex IX which provides the essential requirements 
about the design, production, operation and maintenance of unmanned aircraft that need to be 
complied with to ensure safe operations. Article 46 specifies the means required to demonstrate 
that the essential requirements are met. The range of risks associated with unmanned aircraft 
operations is very wide compared to traditional, manned aviation. They could range from the 
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traditional high risk operations similar to ‘manned aviation risks’ to very low risk. The proposal 
claims it is necessary to move towards an operation centric approach that assesses the exact risk 
of an operation or of a type of operations. This is required to keep the rules and procedures 
proportionate to the risk of the operation. 
The proposal also addresses mass produced unmanned aircraft which pose a low risk. It 
provides that these should be subject to market surveillance in accordance with Regulation 
765/2008 and Decision 768/2008. Aviation authorities will nevertheless remain involved since 
the operational capacity limitations likely to be imposed will stem directly from traditional 
aviation requirements. 
The proposal also considers the implications of unmanned aircraft for fundamental rights. It 
provides that the “rules regarding unmanned aircraft should as much as possible contribute to 
achieving compliance with relevant rights guaranteed under Union law, in particular the right 
to respect for private and family life, as set out in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, and with the right to protection of personal data, as set out in Article 8 
of that Charter and in Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 
as regulated in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data” (Recital 19). 
Even though the adopted definition of ‘unmanned aircraft’ is very broad and could cover both 
autonomous and remotely piloted aircraft, the systemic interpretation of this provision with the 
definition of ‘equipment to control aircraft remotely’ of Article 3 (30),  Articles 45-47, Annex 
IX and Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 
2014 all seem to indicate undoubtedly that the proposal does not make an attempt to bring fully 
autonomous flights within its ambit. 
Since the proposal is subject to change, no decisive comments could be made at this stage about 
the potential impact of these rules on the industry. 
EASA ‘Prototype’ Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations  
In 2016, EASA announced a ‘Prototype’ Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft 
Operations. The envisaged legal basis for the adoption of this regulation is the proposed new 
Basic Regulation. Pursuant to this proposal and the ‘prototype’ regulation, EASA is vested with 
the power to adopt Commission acts for the design, production, maintenance and operation of 
unmanned aircraft systems and their engines, propellers, parts, non-installed equipment and 
equipment to control them remotely. 
EASA proposed the regulation as a ‘prototype’ in order to “reflect the fact that they [Member 
States] should help preparing the formal rulemaking process that will follow”.83 The rationale 
                                                          
83 EASA, Explanatory Note on 'Prototype' Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations, available 
at: 
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Explanatory%20Note%20for%20the%20UAS%20Prototype%20re
gulation%20final.pdf, p. 5, last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
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of the proposal is to “gather reactions which will be used to develop the necessary Notice of 
Proposed Amendments”.84 
Recital 2 of the ‘prototype’ regulation reinforces the premise that measures should be 
proportionate to the nature and risk of the type of unmanned aircraft operation and should in 
particular take due account of the type of operation and whether the operation is open to 
members of the public; the extent to which other air traffic or persons and property on the 
ground could be endangered by the operation; the type of airspace used and territory overflown; 
the complexity and performance of the aircraft involved; the type, scale, and complexity of the 
operation or activity, including, where relevant, the size and type of the traffic handled by the 
responsible organisation or person. The Explanatory Note to the ‘Prototype’ Regulation 
confirms that the consequences of a loss of control of an unmanned aircraft is “highly dependent 
on the operational environment”.85 
Article 3 of the ‘prototype’ regulation lists the categories of unmanned aircraft operations. It 
follows the three-category approach: (1) open category; (2) ‘specific’ category; and (3) 
‘certified’ category. Also, the ‘prototype’ regulation states the principles for unmanned aircraft 
operations in Article 4. The regulation provides that the operator of an unmanned aircraft shall 
be responsible for its safe operation and that they should comply with the requirements of the 
regulation and other applicable regulations, in particular those related to security, privacy, data 
protection, liability, insurance and environmental protection. The regulation also provides for a 
registration procedure with the competent authority, mandatory displaying of registration 
marks, equipping the aircraft with electronic identification means.86 
For operations in the ‘open’ category, which do not require a prior authorisation by the 
competent authority, Article 5 and Annex I set out the requirements include a combination of 
safety measures such as requirements and limitations set by the regulation, limitations defined 
by the competent authority for geofencing87 purposes or for particular airspace areas etc. The 
open category is further divided into subcategories depending on the different levels of risk. 
For operations in the ‘specific’ category, a prior authorisation by the competent authority is 
required, and it should take into account the mitigation measures identified in an operational 
risk assessment. As an exception to this rule, in certain ‘standard scenarios’88 a declaration by 
the operator is sufficient. 
For operations in the ‘certified’ category, a certification of the aircraft is required, as well as a 
licenced remote pilot and an operator approved by the competent authority in order to ensure 
                                                          
84 Ibid. 
85 EASA, 'Prototype' Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations, p. 3, available at: 
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/UAS%20Prototype%20Regulation%20final.pdf, last accessed: 21 
March 2017. 
86 ‘Electronic identification’ is defined in Article 2(2)(f) as “the capability to identify a UA in flight without direct 
physical access to that aircraft”. 
87 ‘Geofencing’ is defined in Article 2(2)(j) as “an automatic function to limit the access of the UA to airspace 
areas or volumes provided as geographical limitations based on the UA position and navigation data”. 
‘Geographical limitations’ are defined in Article 2(2)(i) as “restricted airspace volume defined through electronic 
map data”. 
88 The Explanatory Note clarifies that EASA will publish these scenarios based on the performance of risks 
assessments for specific type of flights or specific operations, such as infrastructure inspection (p. 11). 
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an appropriate level of safety. These requirements are comparable to those for manned aviation 
and the roles played by EASA and the national aviation authorities are significant. 
The regulation introduces the concept of ‘safety-critical services’ (Article 7) and provides a 
non-exclusive list of services which may be considered ‘safety-critical’. These include: 
providing geographical data and limitations; collecting and forwarding occurrence data; the 
training of pilots. Any provider of such services is responsible for the accuracy and integrity of 
the provided information and data, and for the quality of the services. These are demonstrated 
by a suitable organisational structure, appropriate documented procedures, and adequate 
resources and personnel. 
The regulation entrusts the competent authorities with the task of defining airspace areas or 
special zones where unmanned aircraft operations are not permitted without prior authorisation 
or are not permitted at all; where unmanned aircraft shall comply with defined technical or 
performance specifications, including mandatory equipment or functions that enable easy 
identification or automatically limit the airspace they can enter (geofencing); and where 
unmanned aircraft operations shall comply with specified environmental standards. 
The annexes to the regulation provide very detailed requirements for the different categories 
and subcategories of unmanned aircraft operations. Since these are, however, only proposals, 
no conclusive analysis or recommendations based on them could be made at this stage. 
3. STANDARDISATION 
 
While the current legislative proposals are all aimed at ensuring a high level of safety while 
encouraging investment and innovation, safety might still be at risk if no sufficiently stable and 
precise standards are mandated. 
In the Explanatory Note to the ‘Prototype’ Regulation, EASA noted that it is already 
participating in the RPAS panel of ICAO as well as in JARUS.  
JARUS is an expert group comprising representatives of the national aviation authorities 
(NAAs) and regional aviation safety organizations. It aims at creating and recommending a 
single set of technical, safety and operational requirements for the certification and safe 
integration of unmanned aircraft systems into airspace and at aerodromes. JARUS’ objective is 
to provide guidance material aimed at facilitating each authority to write their own requirements 
and to avoid duplicate efforts.89 
JARUS is composed of six Working Groups, as follows: 
 WG 1 ‘Operational and Personnel Requirements (OPS)’; 
 WG 2 ‘Operations (OPS)’; 
 WG 3 ‘Airworthiness (AW)’; 
 WG 4 ‘Detect and Avoid (DA)’; 
 WG 5 ‘Command, Control and Communication Group (C3)’; 
                                                          
89 More information is available at: http://jarus-rpas.org/, last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
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 WG 6 ‘Safety & Risk Management’ 
Recently, JARUS has published the following documents of relevance to the standardisation of 
unmanned aircraft operations: 
 Certification Specification for Light Unmanned Rotorcraft Systems;90 
 Guidance material to explain the concept of C2 link RCP and identify the requirements 
applicable to the provision of C2 communications;91 
 Recommendations concerning uniform personnel licensing and competencies in the 
operation of RPAS;92 
 Recommendations for States to use for their own national legislation, concerning 
Certification Specification for Light Unmanned Aeroplane Systems.93 
Existing studies have recognised the need of developing standards for identification of the 
unmanned aircraft, pilot competencies, data link security etc. Standardisation of unmanned 
aircraft operations is no less critical than it is for manned aviation. Thus, the coordinated action 
of ICAO, EASA, JARUS and the national aviation authorities will be of crucial importance in 
this regard. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The brief overview of the existing policy and legislative initiatives at EU level clearly 
demonstrate that unmanned aircraft operations are high on the agenda. However, two critical 
remarks could be made. First, the slow process of rulemaking has stalled the initial ambition of 
integrating unmanned aircraft into non-segregated airspace by 2016. Second, the absence of 
rules have forced many countries to consider national legislation governing all types of 
operations. While the guidance of ICAO has certainly influenced this process, national 
legislations could provide for different regimes for one and the same operations, or mandate 
different requirements or impose significant restrictions. The effect of these diverging 
approaches is that the market’s fragmentation is slowly progressing. The absence of uniform 
rules at EU level is stifling innovation and restrictive national rules act as disincentives for 
manufacturers and commercial actors to take steps towards producing and commercial 
exploitation of unmanned aircraft. While some of these issues will be overcome by the reform 
of the Basic Regulation and the adoption of delegated acts by the European Commission, the 
impact of existing national rules on the development of this nascent market is yet to be 
evaluated. 
  
                                                          
90 Available at: http://jarus-rpas.org/sites/jarus-rpas.org/files/storage/Library-
Documents/jar_01_doc_jarus_certification_specification_for_lurs_-_30_oct_2013.pdf, last accessed: 21 March 
2017. 
91 Available at: http://jarus-rpas.org/sites/jarus-rpas.org/files/storage/Library-
Documents/jar_02_doc_jarus_rpas_c2_link_rcp_-_10_oct_2014_1.pdf, last accessed: 21 March 2017. 
92 Available at: http://jarus-rpas.org/sites/jarus-rpas.org/files/jar_03_doc-fcl_0.pdf, last accessed: 21 March 2017.  
93 Available at: http://jarus-rpas.org/sites/jarus-rpas.org/files/jar_05_doc_cs-luas_v0_3.pdf, last accessed: 21 
March 2017.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE CASE OF BELGIUM: RULES ON REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT  
 
This chapter focuses on the place of the recently adopted Royal Decree on the use of remotely 
piloted aircraft in Belgian airspace in the general aviation legal framework of Belgium. In the 
context of SafeDroneWare, this chapter will discuss the structure of the decree, focusing on the 
sections of importance to ensuring the safe operation of an unmanned aircraft. It will critically 
analyse the requirements of the royal decree in light of the recent policy and legislative 
initiatives at EU level. The chapter will particular focus on the level of autonomy allowed by 
the royal decree and will argue that the balance between safety and autonomy is critical to the 
success of commercial unmanned aviation. 
1. GENERAL AVIATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In Belgium, the regulation of air traffic navigation falls within the federal competencies.94 The 
legal framework comprises a set of laws and royal decrees that have different relationship with 
the recently adopted Royal Decree on the use of remotely piloted aircraft in Belgian airspace. 
These legal instruments will be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs in order to outline 
the general framework within which the Royal decree on the use of remotely piloted aircraft in 
Belgian airspace operates. 
1.1.Loi du 27 juin 1937 portant révision de la loi du 16 novembre 1919 relative à la 
réglementation de la navigation aérienne 
The main legal instrument in the field is the Law of 27 June 1937 revising the Law of 16 
November 1919 concerning the regulation of Navigation in the Air. This law stipulates in 
Article 2 that “the navigation of national aircraft above the territory of the Kingdom is free, 
except for the restrictions provided for by this act and these that will be enacted by royal 
decrees”.95 
Since the regulated matter is one of public interest and largely falls into the domain of public 
law, it has rightly been pointed out in literature that the fact that for a long period of time no 
royal decree has been governing the operations of remotely piloted aircraft does not mean they 
have been allowed. To the contrary, the lack of specific regulation implies that the utilisation 
of remotely piloted aircraft has been largely prohibited.96 
1.2.Arrêté royal du 15 mars 1954 réglementant la navigation aérienne pour toute 
exploitation commerciale de la navigation aérienne 
                                                          
94 Maxime Vanderstraeten; Sebastian Riger-Brown, "L'usage Des Drones Civils Enfin Réglementé – Bref Survol 
De L'arrêté Royal Du 10 Avril 2016," Journal des tribunaux, no. 31 (2016): 547. 
95 In French : « La circulation des aéronefs nationaux au-dessus du territoire du Royaume est libre, sauf les 
restrictions  résultant de la présente loi et celles qui seront édictées par arrêté royal. » 
96 See in the same sense Riger-Brown,  547. 
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The Royal Decree of 15 March 1954 regulating air transport provides in Article 46 that the 
operation of scheduled air services is subject to a prior authorisation by the Minster responsible 
for aeronautical administration or his delegate. Furthermore, Article 47 stipulates that the 
operation of non-scheduled air transport is subject to the issuance of a prior operating permit 
by the Minister responsible for aeronautical administration or his delegate. Thus, it follows that 
all commercial operations of a remotely piloted aircraft have been prohibited prior to the 
adoption of the royal decree of 2016. In the absence of any kind of legal rules regulating the 
certification of remotely piloted aircraft, it would not have been possible for the DGTA to issues 
an operating permit. Reportedly, the DGTA has not issued any operating permits save for cases 
of test flights and for scientific purposes.97 
Against this background and the pressing requests from industry, in 2016, a new legal 
instrument was adopted to explicitly regulate the operations of remotely piloted aircraft. 
1.3.Arrêté royal du 10 avril 2016 relatif à l’utilisation des aéronefs télépilotés dans 
l’espace aérien belge 
The Royal decree of 10 April 2016 on the use of remotely piloted aircraft in Belgian airspace 
was adopted on the basis of the Law of 27 June 1937 revising the Law of 16 November 1919 
concerning the regulation of Navigation in the Air. It entered into force on the 25th April 2016.  
The scope and the detailed rules provided for by the royal decree will be analysed in the next 
parts of this chapter. 
1.4.Arrêté ministériel du 3 août 1994 fixant les conditions de délivrance des licences 
d’exploitation aux transporteurs aériens 
The Ministerial decree of 3 August 1994 laying down the conditions for the issuance of 
operating licences to air careers is also issued on the basis of the Law of 27 June 1937 revising 
the Law of 16 November 1919 concerning the regulation of Navigation in the Air. 
The decree does not contain any specific provisions concerning remotely piloted aircraft. Thus, 
the absence of any such provisions to this effect, similarly to the case with the Royal decree of 
15 March 1954 regulating air transport, means that operations of remotely piloted aircraft have 
been prohibited before the adoption of the royal decree of 2016. 
1.5.Arrêté royal du 19 décembre 2014 relatif aux règles de l'air et aux dispositions 
opérationnelles relatives aux services et procédures de navigation aérienne 
The Royal decree of 19 December 2014 implementing the common rules of the air and 
operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation provides for the 
adoption of rules regarding recreational use of remotely piloted aircraft. Thus, Article 18, § 1 
(3) lists a number of operations that are subject to ministerial authorisation, such as the 
development of engines capable of damaging an aircraft, ie remotely controlled spacecraft. 
Article 18 of the Royal decree of 19 December 2014 implementing the common rules of the air 
and operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation is the legal 
                                                          
97 Ibid. 
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ground for the adoption of Circulaire CIR/GDF01 du 1er juin 2005. This ministerial circular 
governs the use of model aircraft (remotely controlled aircraft). It restricts the use of model 
aircraft to certain terrains suitable for aeromodelling approved by the DGTA. Thus, before the 
adoption of the Royal decree of 2016, the use of remotely piloted aircraft for recreational 
purposes, even on private land, was prohibited. 
1.6.Décret du 21 octobre 1997 concernant la conservation de la nature 
In addition to the rules on safety established by the general aviation framework in Belgium, 
several legal instruments deal with aspects of environmental protection. These provisions could 
be relevant to the operation of remotely piloted aircraft. The relevant provisions from the 
Decree of 21 October 1997 regarding the preservation of nature are contained in Articles 32, 
33 and 35. 
Article 32, paragraph 1 prescribes that the Flemish government may designate or approve, as a 
nature reserves, land of importance for the preservation and development of nature or for the 
preservation and development or the natural environment. Article 33, paragraph 1 specifies that 
a Flemish nature reserve is a protected zone designated by the Flemish government for the lands 
owned or rented by the Flemish region or made available for this purpose. The second paragraph 
further defines “protected nature reserve” as a protected area not referred to in the first 
paragraph which is approved by the Flemish government at the request of the owner and/or the 
holder of the right to use, with their consent or that of the manager (gestionnaire), if the owner 
agrees. The third paragraph clarifies that in areas of open space, forest areas, forest extension 
zones or V.E.N, each nature reserve may be subject to an extension zone in which the right of 
pre-emption is applicable in accordance with Article 37 (on acquisition). 
Finally, according to Article 35, § 2 (12), in nature reserves, unless approved by an approved 
management plan, it is prohibited to fly over the ground at low altitude or to land there with 
aircraft, helicopters, balloons and other aircraft of any kind. The last preposition refers to any 
kind of aircraft which implies that remotely piloted aircraft, subject to the Royal decree of 2016, 
make no exception. 
1.7.Ordonnance relative aux déchets Ord./B. 1 mars 2012 
The ordinance of 1 March 2012 on waste also contains relevant provisions on environmental 
protection. Thus, Article 3 (20), (21), (23) define terms such as ‘special zone of preservation’, 
‘special zone of protection’, and ‘Brussels ecological network’. These provisions include the 
scope of protection sites designated under the Natura 2000 programme. 
The provision of Article 27, § 1 (26) prohibits flying over the ground at low altitude, taking off 
and landing of planes, helicopters, balloons and other aircraft of any kind as well as the release 
of kerosene, except when in distress. The prohibition covers natural reserves, except as provided 
in the management plan adopted under sections 29, 32, 37 or 50, or by derogation granted 
pursuant to section 83, subsection 3 of the ordinance. The second paragraph of Article 27 
provides that the government may specify the prohibitions referred to in the first paragraph and 
may, for reasons of nature preservation, take additional general measures in favour of nature 
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reserves applicable within or outside the scope of the reserve, such as adoption of environmental 
quality standards. 
2. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE RULES ON REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT IN 
BELGIUM. AUTONOMOUS FLIGHTS 
 
Article 3, § 1 defines the scope of application of the royal decree. Thus, it applies to any 
remotely piloted aircraft taking off or landing on Belgian territory or undertaking part of its 
flight in Belgian airspace, when it is not covered by European regulations. The royal decree 
explicitly excludes the following cases from its scope of application: 
 remotely piloted aircraft operated inside buildings; 
 remotely piloted aircraft used during the course of operations by the military, customs 
and excise, police, search and rescue, firefighting, coastal surveillance or similar 
operations or activities. 
The royal decree provides specifically in Article 3, § 2 that the provisions of Article 4 and the 
following of the decree do not apply to model aircraft with a maximum take-off mass of less 
than 1 kg, if their use meets the following conditions: 
 they are used solely for recreational purposes; 
 they fly at a height above the ground that does not exceed 10 m; 
 they are used in the private sphere and away from any public spaces; 
 they do not fly within a radius of 3 km of airports or civil and military aerodromes; 
 they do not fly over industrial complexes, prisons, the Zeebrugge LNG terminal, nuclear 
power stations or open-air gatherings; 
 the user takes care not to compromise the safety of other aircraft or people or assets on 
the ground; 
 the user respects applicable privacy legislation. 
In addition, the royal decree prohibits explicitly autonomous flights of remotely piloted aircraft. 
The provision of Article 3, § 3 reads, as follows: “The use of autonomous aircraft, i.e. unmanned 
aircraft that do not permit real-time intervention by a pilot to manage the flight, is forbidden”.98 
The text of this provision is problematic in least two directions. 
First, the royal decree does not define unmanned aircraft but defines ‘manned aircraft’ in Article 
1 (11). The legislator’s juridical technique could be criticised for its poor choice to extract the 
meaning of a notion that is used to define an exception by means of a logical argument a 
contrario (appeal from the contrary). Instead, a clear definition of ‘unmanned aircraft’ should 
have been provided, similarly to the approach chosen in EASA’s ‘Prototype’ Regulation or the 
European Commission’s Proposal for Basic Regulation. 
Second, the provision seemingly does not prohibit per se autonomous flights but rather 
autonomous flights that do not permit real-time intervention by a pilot (emphasis added). It 
                                                          
98 In French : « §3. L’utilisation des aéronefs autonomes c’est-à-dire des aéronefs non-habités ne permettant pas 
l’intervention d’un pilote en temps réel pour gérer le vol est interdite. » 
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could be argued that a fully autonomous system is not prohibited by the royal decree as long as 
the possibility for manual control by the pilot is retained and made available at all times. 
However, it is reasonable to ask if this was indeed the rationale behind this provision. The 
systemic place of the provision is in the chapter devoted to the scope of application of the royal 
decree.99 Does that imply that the legislator’s intent was to exclude altogether any form of 
autonomous flights from the royal decree’s scope of application? The result of a teleological 
interpretation of the provision in line with the outlined international rules and policy guidelines 
could be a sign of the legislator’s intention to exclude only fully autonomous flights. This will 
be in line with the idea of maintaining control over the aircraft at all times which is an obligation 
placed on the remote pilot. Thus, it is reasonable to accept a corrective interpretation 
(interpretatio correctiva) that prohibits fully autonomous flights only, to the extent that they 
deprive the remote pilot of the ability to intervene in the aircraft’s operation, change its mission 
etc. 
The royal decree provides for the possibility of derogations from some of its provisions. A 
reasonable question could be asked as to whether a derogation from the prohibition of (fully) 
autonomous flights is possible. Article 5 of the royal decree provides that the Minister or their 
delegate, the Director General, may authorise a derogation to the provisions of Articles 6 to 14 
of this decree if the proposed operations present an acceptable level of safety both for air traffic 
and for people and assets on the ground. Articles 6 to 14 of the royal decree establish the rules 
of the air and the explicit reference to them only leads one to the conclusion that a derogation 
from Article 3, § 3 on this legal ground is not be possible. However, Article 4, which is in the 
chapter delineating the decree’s scope of application, stipulates that the minister may authorise 
derogations to the conditions of this decree for activities of public interest such as traffic 
surveillance activities or environmental control missions undertaken by or on behalf of public 
authorities (emphasis added). First, the decree refers to the notion of ‘public interest’ which is 
not explicitly defined.100 Nevertheless, the provided examples of environmental control 
missions could, for instance, refer to air quality monitoring missions, such as one of the use 
cases in SafeDroneWare. This division seems to be a reference to the classical distinction 
between state and civil aircraft whose roots could be dated back to the days before the adoption 
of CC44. Second, the main criterion for distinguishing between missions in public or private 
interest seems to be the circumstance whether the mission is undertaken by or on behalf of a 
public authorities. This implies that a mission could be carried out both a public body and by a 
private entity entrusted with the task of carrying out a mission on behalf of a public authority.  
A reasonable question to ask is whether the possibility for derogations referred to in Article 4 
could be exercised in respect of any provision of the royal decree. The text seems to be clear in 
specifying that the derogations could cover the conditions of this decree, ie any provision of it, 
including Article 3, § 3, as long as the conditions for the derogation are met. Furthermore, its 
systemic place in the chapter defining the scope of application of the royal decree is a strong 
indication that the legislator’s intent was to provide for a possibility for derogation to any 
conditions of the royal decree. Thus, it could be concluded that fully autonomous flights are 
                                                          
99 Article 3 of the Royal decree. 
100 Jean Pierre Kesteloot, "L'arrêté Royal Du 10 Avril 2016 Relatif Aux Drones : Premier Commentaire," Revue 
générale des assurances et des responsabilités, no. 6 (2016): 3. 
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possible, however, only subject to a derogation by the Minister subject to the conditions of 
Article 4 of the royal decree in the context of activities of public interest undertaken by or on 
behalf of public authorities. 
Finally, the provision of Article 6 of the royal decree explicitly prohibits any operations of 
remotely piloted aircraft which include (exhaustively listed): (1) operation on ATS (Air Traffic 
Service) routes such as those referred to in Article 2(46) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
923/2012; (2) carrying of passengers; (3) carrying of mail or freight; (4) dropping of objects or 
undertaking spraying while in flight; (5) towing; (6) performing aerobatics; (7) flying in 
formation. The drafters’ choice to exclude carrying mail or freight of the scope of the royal 
decree is severely criticised in literature.101 It is argued that if the transportation of passengers 
is prohibited on the grounds of safety, the prohibition of carrying of mail or freight can hardly 
be justified for these same reasons. Furthermore, since this is one of the most prominent sectors 
for commercial applications of remotely piloted aircraft, the prohibition seems to be too 
restrictive. 
3. ACTORS INVOLVED IN REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS. RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
The royal decree defines several actors in line with the recommendations of ICAO and the 
distinctions made at EU level. In this sense, the Belgian legislation does not deviate from the 
existing international practice. 
The royal decree defines the following main actors of relevant for operations of remotely piloted 
aircraft. 
3.1.Manufacturer 
The manufacturer is not explicitly defined as an actor by the royal decree. Its role is mainly 
defined through the obligations that are imposed upon it. The manufacturer has, among other, 
the following key obligations: 
 The manufacturer is obliged to create an RPAS flight manual (arg. Article 44, § 1 and 
§ 2). 
 The manufacturer of a RPAS or his representative may ask DGTA, for a type of RPAS, 
to examine: (1) the compliance of the RPAS with the technical specifications listed in 
the RPAS flight manual or an equivalent document; and, (2) fitness to be operated 
under the specified conditions (arg. Article 42, § 1). 
 The manufacturer must prepare a maintenance manual describing the actions to be 
taken to maintain the characteristics of RPAS in time (arg. Article 42, § 3, 3 °). 
 The manufacturer must set the conditions for keeping the RPAS with its command and 
control system airworthy (arg. Article 46). 
                                                          
101 Ibid., 6. 
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In addition, if involved in the operation of the RPAS, the manufacturer shall immediately report 
any incident or accident arising during use of the RPAS to the DGTA and the Air Accident 
Investigation Unit pursuant to Article 96 of the royal decree. 
It could be said that the manufacturer’s obligations are mainly related to ensuring the 
compliance, airworthiness and fitness for operation of the remotely piloted aircraft. Ensuring 
the safety of the flight itself comprises a set of obligations divided between the operator and the 
remote pilot. 
3.2.Operator 
The operator is defined by Article 1(6) of the royal decree as “a natural or legal person operating 
or proposing to operate one or more remotely piloted aircraft”. The definition is clear in 
specifying that the act of operating a remotely piloted aircraft is not conditio sine qua non for 
determining a party as an operator; a mere proposing to operate one or more remotely piloted 
aircraft is sufficient. 
The operator has a number of obligations which could be summarised in the following way: 
 Guarantee safety of operations (arg. Article 80, § 1 (1)) 
 Undertake maintenance operations (arg. Article 80, § 1 (2)) 
 Keep a maintenance log for each RPAS (arg. Article 80, § 1 (3)) 
 Ensure adequate insurance policy (arg. Article 80, § 1 (4)) 
Operators using remotely piloted aircraft shall be insured according to Article 7 of 
Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2003 on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators (arg. Article 
97) 
 Ensure the processing of any personal data takes place in accordance with the legislation 
(arg. Article 80, § 1 (5)) 
 Provision of information and documents to the General Director (arg. Article 80, § 1 
(6)) 
 Submission to monitoring by DGTA (arg. Article 80, § 1 (7)) 
 Maintain RPAS/command and control system airworthy (arg. Article 46) 
This obligation is not strictly addressed to the operator and it could also be imposed on 
the remote pilot. In any case, the responsible party should make sure that both the RPAS 
and the command and control system are kept in compliance with the initial type 
definition and the conditions set out by the manufacturer. 
 Preserve declarations of incidents or events compromising safety (arg. Article 87) 
 Carry out prior risk analysis for the envisaged class 1 operations (arg. Article 66 (4) 
juncto Article 68). 
In addition, the operator shall immediately report any incident or accident arising during use of 
the RPAS to the DGTA and the Air Accident Investigation Unit pursuant to Article 96. 
It should be kept in mind that the operator’s role could in certain cases overlap with the role 
and obligations of the remote pilot. Thus, it is important to examine each particular situation on 
a case-by-case basis in order to determine and allocate the responsibilities. 
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3.3.Remote pilot 
Article 1 (7) defines a remote pilot as “a person who performs the tasks essential to the operation 
of a remotely piloted aircraft and who, where applicable, operates the flight controls of a 
remotely piloted aircraft during its flight”. 
The remote pilot’s obligations could be summarised in the following way: 
 Monitor the operation and status of the aircraft at any time (arg. Article 83(1)) 
 Control the operation of the RPAS during the flight time (arg. Article 82) 
 Keep control of the aircraft at all times (arg. Article 83 (2)) 
This obligation seems to repeat the obligation imposed by Article 82 to control the 
operation of the RPAS during the flight time. It was already mentioned above, in the 
discussion on autonomous flight, that this requirements prohibits fully autonomous 
flight, that is to say, flights that do not allow for the intervention of a human pilot. The 
temporal notion ‘all times’ is not defined by the royal decree but it is reasonable to 
assume that this includes at least the possibility for intervention on the part of the remote 
pilot at any time from the take-off to the landing. 
 Respect a safety distance between their RPA and any other type of aircraft approaching 
the operation zone of the RPA, and from any other object or obstacle on the flight path 
of the RPA (arg. Article 9 (2)) 
 Maintain sufficient distance from all other aircraft (arg. Article 9(1)) 
 Maintain a reasonable and appropriate distance between the RPA and any surrounding 
obstacles102 (arg. Article 11(1)) 
 Keep a minimum distance of 30 metres from an obstacle (arg. Article 11(2)) 
 Keep a distance between the remote pilot and the RPA which may not under any 
circumstances exceed the range of the radio connection with the RPAS (arg. Article 12, 
para 2) 
 Give way to all manned aircraft (arg. Article 10 (1)) 
 Maintain direct unaided visual contact with the RPA (arg. Article 12(1)) 
 Fly within direct view of the remote pilot or RPA observer (arg. Article 14 (2)) 
This obligation could be derogated by advance authorisation of the Minister pursuant to 
Article 14 (3). 
 Fly away from clouds (arg. Article 14 (1)) 
This obligation could be derogated by advance authorisation of the Minister pursuant to 
Article 14 (3). 
 Ensure that minimum meteorological conditions are met along the route (arg. Article 
83(3), Article 14, para 3) 
                                                          
102 The provisions of the Commission Implementing  Regulation 932/2012 define ‘obstacle’ as : «all fixed (whether 
temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that: (a) are located on an area intended for the 
surface movement of aircraft; or (b) extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight; or (c) 
stand outside those defined surfaces and that have been assessed as being a hazard to air navigation»  (In French : 
« tous les objets fixes (provisoires ou permanents) et mobiles, ou des parties de ces objets, qui : a) sont situés sur 
une zone destinée aux évolutions des aéronefs à la surface ; ou b) s’étendent au-dessus d’une surface définie, 
destinée à protéger l’aéronef en vol ; ou c) se trouvent en dehors de ces surfaces définies et ont été jugés comme 
représentant un risque pour la navigation aérienne ») (arg. Articles 2, 98) 
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 Ensure take-off mass does not exceed 150 kg (arg. Article 1 (4)) 
If the take-off mass exceeds 150 kg, the operation will fall within the ambit of the Basic 
Regulation and will be subject to the much stricter requirements for airworthiness and 
certification of the manned aviation. 
 Ensure take-off and landing zone conditions (arg. Article 84, § 3) 
This obligation is a complex one because it contains the following elements that should 
be taken into account: (1) free of any obstacles (Article 84, § 3 (4)); (2) have necessary 
equipment (Article 84, § 3 (3)); (3) offer adequate surface conditions for the type of 
operation (Article 84, § 3 (5)); (4) ensure sufficient safety conditions (Article 84, § 3 
(1)); (5) be well dimensioned (Article 84, § 3 (2)). 
 Maintain horizontal visibility at least equal to 1.5 times the distance between the RPA 
and the remote pilot or RPA observer (arg. Article 14 (3)) 
 Keep control of the aircraft at all times (arg. Article 83 (2)) 
 Maintain RPAS/command and control system airworthy (arg. Article 46) 
As noted above, the royal decree does not impose this obligation on a specific party. 
Even though it is reasonable to assume that the operator is the party that should be 
responsible for the airworthiness of the remotely piloted aircraft and the command and 
control system, it is not impossible that this obligations might also be imposed on the 
remote pilot in certain circumstances. 
 Ensure that the RPAS has been well maintained before each flight (arg. Article 83 (5)) 
 Possess sufficient knowledge of the layout of the aerodrome or the operating site (arg. 
Article 84, § 2) 
 Prepare the flight at an aerodrome or an operating site (arg. Article 84, § 1) 
 Terminate flight in situations involving danger for air traffic (arg. Article 7) 
This obligation is subject to two cumulative conditions that should be present at the 
same time: (1) all safety requirements must be met before the termination of the flight; 
(2) the flight must be terminated as soon as the requirements are met. The notion of 
‘danger for air traffic’ is not defined by the royal decree but it is reasonable to assume 
that it should be interpreted broadly to include any event that might endanger manned 
or other unmanned aircraft. 
 Keep a flight log for all flights (arg. Article 16 (1) and (2)) 
 Ensure the RPA maintains continuous command and control link (arg. Article 8 juncto 
Article 1 (6) juncto Article 93, para 1) 
 Develop procedures for loss of connection (arg. Article 8 (1) juncto Article 45 (2) juncto 
Article 93 (2)) 
 Implement the established procedures in the event of loss of the command and control 
connection/link (arg. Article 8 (1)) 
 Ensure compatibility of remote pilot station with the RPA (arg. Article 8, para 2) 
 Ensure availability of resources necessary for a safe flight (arg. Article 83 (6)) 
 Consider the requirements mentioned in the flight manual of the RPAS (arg. Article 84, 
para 2) 
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It is not clear how compliance with this obligation must be ensured but it is reasonable 
to assume that if the flight manual prescribes some specific requirements, these should 
in all cases be taken into account by the remote pilot. 
 Consider other activities on the ground, topography, obstacles, atmospheric effects on 
radio communications and interference with the frequencies used (arg. Article 83 (7)) 
Similar to the previous obligation, this obligations implies that the remote pilot should 
take into account all the relevant factors on the ground before and during the 
implementation of the operation. These obligations are particularly suitable for 
execution in an automated manner since this would enable the remote pilot to take quick 
decisions. 
 Compliance with weight and centre of gravity restrictions (arg. Article 83 (4)) 
 Compliance with the privacy legislation in force (arg. Article 83 (9)) 
This obligation is not further specified by the royal decree. However, the applicable 
provisions of the privacy legislation, including but not limited to the Belgian Data 
Protection Act, the General Data Protection Regulation and other legal instruments 
should apply in full effect. 
Article 96 provides that the remote pilot shall immediately report any incident or accident 
arising during use of the RPAS to the DGTA and the Air Accident Investigation Unit. 
3.4.Observer 
Article 1 (8) of the royal decree defines the ‘RPA observer’ as ‘a trained and competent person, 
designated by the operator, who, by visual observation of the remotely piloted aircraft, helps 
the remote pilot to undertake the flight in complete safety, according to the requirements of this 
decree’.103 The law limits the number of observers to two people (arg. Article 12(2)). 
The RPA observer’s presence is only required in certain circumstances. Thus, Article 65 (4) 
prescribes that class 2 operations shall be carried out on the following conditions: (…) the flight 
is operated in accordance with the rules of the air, in particular the height specified in Article 
13, § 1, and without the aid of an RPA observer (emphasis added). Thus, it follows that class 2 
operation should be carried out without the aid of an RPA observer, leaving the role of an RPA 
observer applicable only to class 1 operations. 
The RPA observer’s obligations could be summarised in the following way: 
 Fly within direct view of the remote pilot or RPA observer (arg. Article 14(2)) 
 Maintain horizontal visibility at least equal to 1.5 times the distance between the RPA 
and the remote pilot or RPA observer (arg. Article 14(3)) 
 Maintain direct unaided visual contact with the RPA (arg. Article 12(1)) 
In addition, the RPA observer shall immediately report any incident or accident arising during 
use of the RPAS to the DGTA and the Air Accident Investigation Unit pursuant to Article 96. 
                                                          
103 In French : « une personne formée et compétente, désignée par l’exploitant, qui, par observation visuelle de 
l’aéronef télépiloté, aide le télépilote à réaliser le vol en toute sécurité en respectant les exigences du présent 
arrêté » 
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3.5.Minister 
The law entrusts the minister with several tasks in the regulation of remotely piloted aircraft 
operations. As already pointed out, Article 4 of the royal decree stipulates that the minister may 
authorise derogations to the conditions of this decree for activities of public interest such as 
traffic surveillance activities or environmental control missions undertaken by or on behalf of 
public authorities. 
It is noteworthy that Article 68(3) of the royal decree establishes a legal fiction in stipulating 
that operations carried in derogation from the provisions made by the royal decree are 
considered class 1a operations, ie operations with increased risk. 
The Minister or their delegate, the Director General, may also give advance authorisation for 
operations derogating the conditions set out in Article 14(1), including night operations if these 
are undertaken in a Temporary Reserved Airspace (TRA) or Temporary Segregated Airspace 
(TSA), setting the conditions for these operations, and taking into account the technical and 
operational characteristics of the RPAS (arg. Article 14(3)). This provision also stipulates that 
a derogation from the rules on flying within direct view of the remote pilot or RPA observer is 
possible by advance authorisation pursuant to Article 14(3). 
 
4. EXPLOITATION AND SAFETY RULES. EXCEPTIONS 
 
In addition to the rules establishing the rights and obligations of the different actors, the royal 
decree also provides for the exploitation and safety rules concerning remotely piloted aircraft 
operations. These rules could be divided in three main categories, ie, common rules, 
applicable to all types of operations, and special rules, applicable, respectively, to class 1 or 
class 2 operations. 
In literature, the following two main types of risk have been identified when it comes to the 
operation of remotely piloted aircraft: (1) interference and conflict with other airspace users, 
including mid-air collision, remotely piloted aircraft ingestion in aircraft turbine engine, etc. 
and (2) damage to the public and property on the ground as a result of a crash.104 
4.1.Common rules 
The common rules match exactly the obligations of the different actors outlined in the previous 
section. Unless explicitly referring to a particular class of operations, these rules are equally 
applicable to both class 1 and class 2 operations. Thus, these rules will not be analysed further 
in this sections. 
4.2.Class 2 operations 
The provision of Article 1 (17) defines class 2 operation as “all aviation activity in which an 
RPA with a maximum take-off mass of less than 5 kg is used for activities such as aerial 
photography, surveying and observing and represents low risk for aviation safety, people and 
                                                          
104 Bernauw,  239. 
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property on the ground”. Article 65 further specifies that Class 2 operations shall be carried out 
on the following conditions: 
 the remote pilot holds a remote pilot certificate or a remote pilot licence; 
 the RPAS is registered under Article 57 or has an equivalent document issued by an 
aviation authority of a Member State of the European Union; 
 the operation is not an operation of Class 1; 
 the flight is operated in accordance with the rules of the air, in particular the height 
specified in Article 13, § 1, and without the aid of an RPA observer; 
 the flight is operated in an area which, within a radius of minimum 50 m, is free of any 
building, any person not involved in the operation, or an animal gathering. 
Thus, at least six main criteria should be met cumulatively for an operation to be considered a 
class 2 operation, ie one representing low risk for aviation safety, people and property on the 
ground. These could be classified, as follows: 
 Physical requirements, referring to the characteristics of the aircraft or the , ie, take-off 
mass not exceeding 5 kg (arg. Article 1(17)) 
 Operational requirements, referring to the limitations that should be observed while the 
aircraft is engaged in an operation, ie: 
o Height above ground level should not exceed 150 feet (45.72 m) (arg. Article 
13(1)) 
In particular, Article 13 (1) provides that class 2 operations shall be limited to 
flights within visual line-of-sight (VLOS) to a height of 150 feet AGL in 
uncontrolled airspace. The following operations are prohibited in all 
circumstances: (1) in controlled airspace or airspace with a special status 
(forbidden areas (P), danger areas (D), restricted areas (R) helicopter training 
areas (HTA), low flying areas (LFA) ) when they are active; (2) in temporarily 
reserved airspace (TRA) or temporarily segregated airspace (TSA); and (3) 
within a radius of 1.5 nautical miles of aerodromes for aircraft or ultra-light 
motorized aircraft and within a radius of 0.5 nautical miles of heliports, without 
prior authorization of the operator of the aerodrome or heliport. 
o Area in which the aircraft is operated should be free of any building, person 
not involved in operation, animal gathering within a radius of minimum 50 
m (arg. Article 65(5)) 
o Observation of the rules of the air pursuant to Article 13(1), in particular the 
height specified in Article 13, § 1 (arg. Article 65(4)) 
o Operation should be carried out without the aid of an RPA observer (arg. 
Article 65(4)) 
 Risk assessment requirements, referring to the gravity of the involved risk, ie the 
operation should present a low risk (cumulatively) to: 
o Aviation safety 
o People 
o Property on the ground 
43 | P a g e  
 
 Purpose requirements, referring to a specific set of exhaustively listed purposes which 
the operation has to be compliant with (alternatively): 
o Aerial photography 
o Observation 
o Surveying 
With respect to the purpose requirements, it is worth noticing that the royal decree does not 
define the notions of ‘observation’ or ‘surveying’ which leaves somewhat wide margin of 
discretion to the involved parties to determine the specific purpose of the operation. However, 
it should be kept in mind that for an operation to be considered a class 2 operation, all types of 
requirements listed above should be met cumulatively. 
4.3.Class 1 operations 
Article 1(18) of the royal decree provides that class 1 operations include “all aviation activity 
in which an RPA is used and is likely to represent a moderate or increased risk to aviation safety 
and/or persons and property on the ground because it is carried over an area where the security 
of third parties on the ground may be compromised in case of an emergency or poses a 
significant risk because of its special nature and the local environment in which it takes place.” 
Whether the risk is increased or not is the subject of the risk analysis under Article 68. 
Class 1 operations are further divided in subclasses, ie: class 1a and class 1b depending on 
whether the risk is increased or moderate. Before embarking on analysis of the specific rules, it 
should be noted that the royal decree establishes several common rules that apply to both types 
of class 1 operations. These rules include: 
 Submission of an advance notification to DGTA (arg. Article 66(2)) 
 Creating an operating manual compliant with RPAS flight manual and safety 
recommendation of DGTA (arg. Article 66 (5) juncto Article 78, para 1 and 2 juncto 
Article 79 juncto Article 80, § 2 juncto Annex 4 'Content of the operating manual') 
 Flight in accordance with the procedures of the operating manual (arg. Article 80, § 2 
(5)) 
 Height above ground should not exceed 300 feet/91.44 m. (arg. Article 13, § 2) 
 Prior risk analysis by the operator for the envisaged operations (arg. Article 66 (4) juncto 
Article 68), which should take into account at least the following criteria: 
o Aviation safety 
o Safety of people 
o Safety of property 
o Environment 
o Nature of the envisaged operations 
o Place 
The prohibitions of Article 13(2) of the royal decree are also applicable to class 1 operations. 
Thus, the following operations are prohibited: 
 In controlled airspace or airspace with a special status 
 In temporarily reserved airspace (TRA) or temporarily segregated airspace (TSA) 
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 Within a radius 1.5 nautical miles of aerodromes for aircraft or ultra-light motorized 
aircraft and within a radius 0.5 nautical miles of heliports, without prior authorization 
of the operator of the aerodrome or heliport. 
It is worth noting that the royal decree provides for an exception to the prohibition of carrying 
out operations within a radius of 30 m of an obstacle, provided that the risk analysis 
demonstrates that class 1 operations. 
 
4.3.1. Class 1a operations 
Article 1(19) of the royal decree defines ‘class 1a operation’ as any exploitation of class 1 which 
represents an increased risk. Furthermore, Article 68(3) establishes a legal fiction that three 
particular types of operations are ipso facto considered class 1a operations. Such are operations: 
 carried over or near a gathering of people; or, 
 involving the overflight of people; or, 
 carried out in derogation from the provisions made by the royal decree. 
The specific requirements for class 1a operations include: 
 Need of approval/equivalent document issued by a competent authority (arg. Article 66, 
§ 1 (2)) 
The RPAS used for class 1a operations must have a certificate of compliance issued in 
accordance with Article 48 or an equivalent document issued by a competent authority 
of a Member State of the European Union. 
 Certificate of compliance (arg. Article 66, § 1 (3)) 
 
4.3.2. Class 1b operations 
Article 1(20) of the royal decree defines class 1b operations as “any exploitation of class 1 
which represents a moderate risk”. In addition to the common rules for class 1 operations, 
Article 66 (6) provides that the operator must have received the acknowledgment of the 
declaration referred to in Article 72. 
5. LIABILITY AND INSURANCE ISSUES 
 
The analysis so far has demonstrated that the law mandates a very strict set of safety and 
exploitation rules to be observed by the various actors involved in operations of remotely 
piloted aircraft. In terms of liability, however, the law is not very specific about the applicable 
rules of the allocation of liability. 
In principle, Article 82 of the royal decree provides that the remote pilot shall be responsible 
for the operation of the remotely piloted aircraft system during the flight. Some authors believe 
that this provision does not establish a strict liability regime for the pilot’s actions during the 
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flight.105 Instead, they see in this provision an indication of the pilot’s responsibility to conduct 
the flight and refer to the Chicago Convention’s notion of ‘pilot in command’ referred to in 
Articles 4.5.1 and the following of Annex 6 to CC44.106 The liability for damages of the remote 
pilot, the operator or the manufacturer should be treated in the classical manner as tort liability. 
It is beyond doubt that the remote pilot, in the sense used by the royal decree, acts as the pilot 
in command, ie the pilot responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight 
time (arg. Chicago Convention Annex 2, Art. 2.3.1. and Art. 2.4). As such, the remote pilot 
may incur “possible types of liability”.107 In fact, in literature, it is argued that there is “no 
fundamental difference between the fly-by-wire on-board pilot (often supervising the auto-
pilot) and the remote pilot”.108  
Circular Cir 328-AN/190, C-WP/9781109 makes the pilot in command of the remotely piloted 
aircraft responsible as a pilot of a manned aircraft for the detection and avoidance of potential 
collisions and hazards. It is argued that remote pilots, while not on board the aircraft, will still 
be subject to the same requirements as aircraft pilots in that they are required to observe, 
interpret and consider a wide range of visual signals designed to attract their attention or convey 
information.110 The detect and avoid technology should allow for the detection of an obstacle 
long before the human eye and should enable the implementation of procedures for avoidance 
or, where applicable, the automatic avoidance of the obstacle.111 Technology, particularly 
software, could be especially useful in conveying this information in a meaningful and useful 
manner to the pilot by employing the existing techniques known from manned aviation. 
If the remote pilot is indeed to be treated as a ‘pilot in command’ in a manned aircraft context, 
a reasonable question to ask is, what is then the nature of the operator’s liability?112 The royal 
decree is silent on the operator’s liability, save for the provision of Article 97 on insurance. 
Article 97(1) provides that any operator using an RPAS for commercial activities shall be 
insured according to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 21 April 2004 on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators. 
The second paragraph of Article 97 establishes the regime for non-commercial activities by 
stipulating that any operator, or by default any remote pilot of an RPAS used exclusively for 
non-commercial activities, shall take out civil liability insurance to cover third-party bodily 
injury and material damage. 
While remotely piloted aircraft fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 785/2004, its 
provisions are limited. For example, pursuant to Article 2 of the regulation, it does not apply 
to: state aircraft as referred to in Article 3(b) CC44; model aircraft with a maximum take-off 
mass (MTOM) of less than 20 kg; aircraft, including gliders, with an MTOM of less than 500 
                                                          
105 A. Cassart, "Drones : Y a-T’il Un Télépilote Dans L’aéronef?," Revue du Droit des Technologies de 
l'Information (R.D.T.I.) 2016, no. 1 (2016): 86. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Bernauw,  244. 
108 Ibid., 247. 
109 ICAO. 
110 Abeyratne, Convention on International Civil Aviation : A Commentary, 129. 
111 Lars Hoppe, "Le Statut Juridique Des Drones: Aéronefs Non Habités" (Aix-Marseille 3, 2006), 263. 
112 M. Wouters, "Drones : De Juridische Toekomst Voor Onbemande Vliegtuigsystemen," Cahier du juriste - van 
de jurist 2016, no. 1 (2016). 
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kg, and micro lights, which are used for non-commercial purposes or are used for local flight 
instruction which does not entail the crossing of international borders. 
Some authors have argued that if damages are incurred by third parties on the ground, the strict 
liability provided for by Article 1 of the Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign 
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface of 1952 will apply. They argue that this strict liability 
rests on the operator, according to the class of operation and is subject to the aforesaid insurance 
obligation.113 The difficulties in applying the Rome Convention to the case of remotely piloted 
aircraft were already discussed above in Chapter I, 3. The criticisms are equally valid in a 
national context. While the royal decree solves the problem of identification by introducing a 
mandatory registration of the aircraft pursuant to Article 53 and the following, other criticism 
could still be made that would hinder the application of this regime. Furthermore, the 
registration of the remotely piloted aircraft in the register does not constitute a title of ownership 
of the aircraft, but merely creates a presumption of ownership.114 
Finally, the prohibition of carrying passengers or mail and freight mean that the neither the 
regime of the Montreal Convention, nor the one of the Warsaw Convention shall be applicable 
to remotely piloted aircraft in the sense of the royal decree.115 
It follows from this brief overview of the liability and insurance regime that the remote pilot 
will most likely be treated in the same manner as the pilot in command of a manned aircraft. 
However, the specific allocation of liability between the different actors involved in the chain 
of a remotely piloted aircraft operation will depend on the relationships and involvement in the 
operation of the various actors. In any case, in the absence of specific rules on liability, the 
general rules of civil law for contractual and extra-contractual liability will be applicable. Due 
to the specifics of each case, the assessment will have to be made on a case-by-case basis, hence 
no general conclusion could be made. 
6. PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION RISKS 
 
While the present report is focusing exclusively on the safety rules applicable to remotely 
piloted aircraft, it should be noted that privacy and data protection risks could also play a 
significant role in terms of liability for the involved parties. 
Thus, for example, at least the following two groups of risks should be considered: 
 Intrusion in case of unauthorised overflying of private property116 or overflying 
prohibited or protected zones 
It is well-known that modern aviation has reduced the relevance of the ‘unlimited 
vertical property right’ over land. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that an 
aircraft overflying private land at a very low altitude could be considered “a direct and 
                                                          
113 Cassart,  86. 
114 Kesteloot,  11. See also Max Litvine and Armand Moury, Droit Aérien: Notions De Droit Belge Et De Droit 
International (É. Bruylant, 1970), 147. 
115 Kesteloot,  6. 
116 Bernauw,  242. 
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immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land” and would as such be 
prohibited.117 
 Violation of fundamental rights of citizens to privacy and data protection stemming 
from Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the national 
legislation on privacy and data protection. These risks concern operation by both public 
actors, such as state authorities, and private entities, such as companies. 
The most widely acknowledged risk to rights to privacy and data protection is related to 
the clandestine taking of photographs and videos of individuals. Article 36 CC44 
provides that each contracting State may prohibit or regulate the use of photographic 
apparatus in aircraft over its territory. In Belgium, the rules introduced by the Royal 
Decree of 21 February 1939 subjecting aerial photography from manned aircraft to an 
authorisation of the civil aviation administration have been repealed.118 Thus, presently, 
the taking of aerial photography is not subject to a special authorisation. Nevertheless, 
as prescribed by the royal decree, the remote pilot should observe privacy and data 
protection legislation which necessitates that whenever personal data are processed, be 
it intentionally or inadvertently, the rules shall be observed strictly. 
Since the legal issues of privacy and data protection are outside the scope of the present 
report, they will not be analysed in further details.119 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis of the Belgian legal framework applicable to remotely piloted aircraft 
demonstrates both advantages and disadvantages in terms of effect on the nascent market of 
commercial applications of remotely piloted aircraft. 
In terms of advantages, the royal decree of 2016 brought the long-awaited legal certainty by 
explicating regulating remotely piloted aircraft operations. Furthermore, its strict rules on 
exploitation and safety aim to guarantee that there will be minimum risk to both the safety of 
manned aviation and the safety of people and property on the ground. 
In terms of disadvantages, the royal decree seems to have ‘missed the right time’ by coming 
already too late on the stage.120 Furthermore, the prohibition of autonomous flights and the 
restrictions on the transport of goods and spraying significantly hinders innovation. While the 
derogation procedure is certainly an option that many commercial operators may decide to 
pursue, it risks turning the exception into the rule which, in turn, will reduce the royal decree’s 
scope of application mainly to operations for recreational purposes. 
  
                                                          
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., 242. 
119 For more details on the data protection issues in the context of remotely piloted aircraft, refer to, inter alia, 
Grigorios Tsolias, "Greece∙ Data Protection Risks from the Use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (Rpas) under 
the Vague Legal and Regulatory Framework," European Data Protection Law Review 2, no. 3 (2016). 
120 Riger-Brown. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPERS OF SOFTWARE FOR REMOTELY PILOTED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS  
 
The inventory of the applicable laws and regulation to the operation of remotely piloted aircraft 
systems reveal a picture of diverging, often conflicting rules whose scope of application is not 
always clearly defined. The national legislation of Belgium introduced the long-awaited legal 
certainty but at the same time, it hindered the innovative potential of the nascent market of 
commercial applications of remotely piloted aircraft. Against this backdrop, the final chapter 
of this report attempts to provide a set of simple guidelines for software developers to follow 
and implement the applicable legal rules when developing software for remotely piloted 
aircraft. 
1. REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING AND THE LAW 
 
The law has significant impact on the design and development of software and frameworks 
such as SafeDroneWare make no exception. Regulations have significant impact on the 
elicitation of the requirements of a software system. Furthermore, the impact of standards such 
as DO-178B and DO-178C and their equivalents in Europe published by EUROCAE as ED-
12B ED-12C. 
In the field of aviation, the process is even more complicated because it involves the process of 
certification. Thus, avionics software is often referred to as embedded software with legally 
mandated safety and reliability features. Certification in aviation is defined “legal recognition 
by a certification authority that a product, service, organization or person complies with some 
specific requirements”.121 It follows that correctness, predictability and full compliance at the 
requirements engineering stage are crucial for safety-critical software. 
The elicitation of legal requirements is a challenging task. Legal rules are often well-structured 
and hierarchical but at the same time secondary legislation and case law could bring about 
uncertainty, diverging enforcement and interpretation of this system of rules.122 Furthermore, 
legal provisions often rely on multiple cross-references to other legal provisions which could 
be amended, repealed or construed differently with the passing of time. The main issue, 
however, remains the law’s ambiguity which is inherent to its purpose of accommodating as 
much possible scenarios within its scope as possible to ensure its universal application on the 
territory of a state. 
The ultimate goal of companies and software developers is to make sure their software is 
compliant with relevant laws and regulations to avoid the risks of penalties and reputation loss 
                                                          
121 Gabriella Gigante and Domenico Pascarella, "Formal Methods in Avionic Software Certification: The Do-178c 
Perspective" (paper presented at the International Symposium On Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, 
Verification and Validation, 2012), 4. 
122 Paul N Otto and Annie I Antón, "Addressing Legal Requirements in Requirements Engineering" (paper 
presented at the Requirements Engineering Conference, 2007. RE'07. 15th IEEE International, 2007), 6. 
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as a result of non-compliance.123 As non-functional requirements, the legal requirements are 
often placed in the category of constraints before the design of a particular functionality. Thus, 
for example, the requirement that the remotely piloted aircraft shall maintain sufficient distance 
from other aircraft to minimise effects of wake turbulence acts as a constraint before the range 
of movements of the aircraft. This requirement is not quantifiable, as ‘sufficient distance’ is not 
defined by the rule in nautical miles or another unit. What are the possible solutions before the 
developer in this case? They could refer to ICAO’s standards on separation minima defined in 
nautical miles. However, these standards were adopted to respond to the effects of wake 
turbulence on manned aircraft which are significantly heavier. If applied to remotely piloted 
aircraft, these standards might prove inadequate, insufficient or completely inapplicable not 
least because of the fact that small remotely piloted aircraft are more sensitive to wake 
turbulence than manned aircraft. Furthermore, the developer could refer to industry standards, 
if any, that could act as a guideline. In any case, however, the uncertainty of whether the 
software is compliant with the rule will be an ongoing issue. 
In literature, various approaches for the classification and tracing of non-functional software 
requirements have been suggested.124 The common problem of these approaches is that either 
they often adopt a very simplistic view of the legal system or the suggested solutions are too 
complicated for a legal expert to be involved in the process.125 In order to design legally 
compliant systems, the legal texts should be carefully analysed by teams comprising both 
engineers and legal experts. Some authors126 have suggested that in the process at least the 
following main issues should be considered: 
 Information extraction from law, ie finding the requirements, identification of relevant 
pieces of information and understanding the relationships between the elements. 
 Choice of law, ie analysis of all relevant regulations and prioritisation in line with their 
legal effect and force. 
 Imperfection and vagueness of the law, ie interpretation of the rules in order to 
establish their true meaning. 
 Dynamics of the law, ie taking into account the continuous evolution of the legal system 
and providing for mechanisms to adjust the system to changes occurring on the legal 
landscape. 
In any requirements elicitation exercise, the ultimate goal for the team should be to ensure the 
traceability from software artefacts to the governing legal text. In the process, careful 
                                                          
123 Jeremy C Maxwell et al., "A Legal Cross-References Taxonomy for Reasoning About Compliance 
Requirements," Requirements Engineering 17, no. 2 (2012): 99. 
124 Anas Mahmoud and Grant Williams, "Detecting, Classifying, and Tracing Non-Functional Software 
Requirements," ibid.21, no. 3 (2016). For a criticism of these approaches, see Guido Boella et al., "A Critical 
Analysis of Legal Requirements Engineering from the Perspective of Legal Practice" (paper presented at the 
Requirements Engineering and Law (RELAW), 2014 IEEE 7th International Workshop on, 2014), 17 and the 
following. 
125 David G Gordon and Travis D Breaux, "The Role of Legal Expertise in Interpretation of Legal Requirements 
and Definitions" (paper presented at the Requirements Engineering Conference (RE), 2014 IEEE 22nd 
International, 2014). 
126 Nadzeya Kiyavitskaya, Alžbeta Krausová, and Nicola Zannone, "Why Eliciting and Managing Legal 
Requirements Is Hard" (paper presented at the Requirements Engineering and Law, 2008. RELAW'08., 2008). 
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assessment should be made to ensure that the removal of ambiguities from the legal text does 
not result in a wrong specification which is contrary to the legal rule’s purpose. The following 
section aims to present a few important guidelines that should be observed by legal experts and 
engineers alike and proposes a possible strategy for enhancing the communication process 
between software engineers and legal experts. 
2. PRACTICAL GUIDELINES ON ENGINEERING OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS127 
 
While it is not possible to formulate a set of universally applicable guidelines on how the 
process of requirements engineering and communication between legal experts and engineers 
could be improved, the following points aim to act as an initial set of goals that a team should 
be aiming at. 
1.1.Terminology mapping 
This step involves the establishing of a common terminology apparatus. It requires that software 
engineers and legal experts develop a common set of terms which bear the same meaning to 
both groups. The process involves a thorough study of the available software documentation 
and the available legal texts, judicial interpretation and other relevant tools. 
The initial mapping of terminology will allow the teams to make relevant links and associations. 
The mapping exercise should further aim at establishing the hierarchical relationships between: 
(1) actors, ie the relevant parties that play a role in the system; (2) data objects, ie the types of 
data, the data flows and the dependencies; and (3) actions, ie, the functionality of the system 
that should be mapped to the legal requirements. 
1.2.Requirements identification and disambiguation 
This step takes input from the mapping exercise in the first step and defines the requirements 
for the software system. This step should aim at answering at least the questions of: (1) what a 
requirement means? (2) Why does it exist? (3) How often does it occur? (4) What happens if it 
is not present? (5) Who is involved in the action or description? (6) Are there any questions 
about a user role or a use case? 
This step’s main purpose is to identify the relationships between the different requirements. 
These may be relationships of constraining, but they may equally be dependencies, 
requirements that operationalise other requirements, or requirements that support other 
requirements. 
                                                          
127 The following guidelines have been largely based on ideas adopted from the works of Paul N Otto and Annie I 
Antón, "Managing Legal Texts in Requirements Engineering," in Design Requirements Engineering: A Ten-Year 
Perspective (Springer, 2009). and Kiyavitskaya, Krausová, and Zannone.  
① GOOD PRACTICE 
SafeDroneWare adopted the common terminology used by ICAO and complemented it, where 
applicable, with the legal definitions used in Belgian legislation. 
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It should be kept in mind that there will almost certainly be legal requirements that cannot be 
technically satisfied or can be satisfied only partially. In these cases, the legal experts may 
provide additional guidelines as to what should be observed by the end user of the system or 
what mitigation measures might have to be taken that cannot be technically implemented in the 
software. 
1.3.Requirements elaboration 
This step involves the documenting of the priority and origin of each requirement. At the end 
of this step, the legal requirements should be formulated in a manner sufficiently clear for 
software engineers to understand it without the need of specialised legal knowledge. Legal 
experts should pay specific attention to the risk of creating obstacles or vulnerabilities for legal 
compliance as well as to the risk of creating wrong representations of the legal rules in their 
attempt to simplify them and remove the ambiguity. 
1.4.Traceability 
At this step, the team should make sure that there are sufficiently clear traceability links to legal 
sources for each requirement from the set of requirements produced by the requirements 
disambiguation and elaboration exercises. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The elaboration of guidelines for developers of software on how to implement legal 
requirements is extremely difficult task. The goal of the points made in the previous section is 
to present an initial, high-level map of actions that could potentially enhance the process of 
requirements engineering and help overcome the difficulties encountered in the implementation 
of ambiguous legal provisions. Compliance is a mandatory requirements for a safety-critical 
software system, such as the framework that is being developed in SafeDroneWare.  
In addition, it should be kept in mind that safety-critical systems often must be compliant not 
only with the legal rules stemming from the law but also with standards developed and/or 
adopted by the certification authorities, such as EUROCAE and EASA. Thus, the process of 
requirements engineering requires strong mutual collaboration between experts in software 
engineering, standardisation and legal experts to overcome ambiguity and uncertainty and to 
ensure that the end product is compliant with all safety and other legal requirements.  
② GOOD PRACTICE 
SafeDroneWare created a requirements matrix that provides sufficiently well elaborated 
requirements that could be traced back to their source. 
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